THIRD TOURISM DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
SECONDARY CITIES REVITALIZATION STUDY

Madaba

Social assessment

Annex 2
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country assistance strategy</td>
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<td>CH</td>
<td>Cultural heritage</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community based organization</td>
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<td>CRP</td>
<td>City revitalization program</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of Statistics</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>Environmental Assessment</td>
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<td>GMM</td>
<td>Greater Madaba Municipality</td>
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<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ITFCSD</td>
<td>Italian trust fund for culture and sustainable development</td>
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<td>JTB</td>
<td>Jordan Tourist Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
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<td>MOMA</td>
<td>Ministry of Municipal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<td>MOTA</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEAP</td>
<td>National Environmental Action Plan</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organization</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Awareness</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
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<td>STDTP</td>
<td>Second Tourism Development Project</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
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<td>TTDTP</td>
<td>Third Tourism Development Project</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>URP</td>
<td>Urban regeneration program</td>
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<td>VEC</td>
<td>Valued Environmental Components</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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<td>WHL</td>
<td>World heritage List</td>
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1. **Executive summary**

The movement of accelerated urbanization that Jordan knew since the beginning of the 1970s, combined with the demographic growth and the migratory waves of the populations, deeply transformed the socio-spatial structures of the country. In all of the Jordanian localities, the spatial and urban morphology, the way of life and consumption, the socio-economic structures, the social and collective forms of organization have been strongly affected and transformed. In this context, it is not exaggerated to say that all the Jordanian towns are, to some extent, new cities, which are formed by the assembly of various, more or less uprooted, groups, or “parts” brought back and juxtaposed. Urban development, demographic growth, massive arrival of populations of Palestinian and/or rural origin, as well as the socio-economic evolutions and socio-policies of the Jordanian society; all these phenomena have transformed the socio-spatial structures of these cities and have put under question the various components of their socio-urban traditions, to a point that makes it possible to speak today about “cities in mutation and transition” and “local communities in the course of re-composition and reorganization”.

In this context, Madaba has to face a number of key issues affecting its social and economic development. These key issues include the decay of the socio-urban fabric, the urban disintegration, the loss of commercial centrality and the decay and crisis of public spaces. In fact, after the demographic transformation and the institutional reorganization, Madaba has become a mosaic of disparate, juxtaposed territories. It is a major challenge to establish a new connecting bond amongst these otherwise disconnected realities.

Nowadays, due to its social and physical decay, the historic core is a centrifugal space. The challenge is to restore the core as a centripetal place of attraction, connection, link and communication amongst the different territories of the city. In other words, the right of access to the city is to be returned to the inhabitant, namely to the young people and to disadvantaged groups. This will happen, if the program succeeds in reinforcing the urban integration in a federating space, a space of urban and economic centrality.

The project development objective is to improve urban integration, social cohesion and local economy in Madaba by creating conditions for a process of sustainable revitalization of the historic core and tourism development.

In other words, the main challenge that the historic core of Madaba is facing, is to recover its urban centrality and be revived with a new “social and economic mission” within its regional context. The historic core, restored as public space of social encounter and communication, will create the conditions for a mutual knowledge and acknowledgement amongst the different communities and amongst the different ages and genders. Furthermore, this will answer at the specific needs of the youth that, in the current situation, is locked into the bipolarity between the space of the family and the space of the education, while creating a third space for the communication and the leisure.

The improved quality and livability of the historic core will benefit all city residents, occasional visitors and tourists, to recover centrality, reconstruct social cohesion and revert the decay of the socio-urban fabric;

From a social point of view, the revived historic core will contribute to reconstruct social cohesion amongst the different social groups providing a common federating space for the entire population, where the cultural heritage is preserved and enhanced in both its symbolic and economic role, and urban space is improved for the benefit of residents and visitors.

From an urban point of view, the focus is on the improvement of the socio-urban fabric, the recovery of commercial and urban centrality and the improvement of the urban environment as a high quality civil space.
2. The secondary cities in Jordan

2.1 THE LOCAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Jordan is characterized by a very strong concentration of economic activities in the conurbation of Amman. With the exception of Irbid and Aqaba, almost all of the fifty urban, including the historical cities although to a lesser degree, are characterized by the weakness of their functions and their economic activities and by their dependence on the Capital city. During the last decades, the population of these cities and surrounding regions found a solution to the question of the access to activity and resources through the emigration towards the countries of the Gulf, employment in the Administration and the army, or employment in the Capital city.

The closing up of the immigration countries and the expulsion of several hundreds of thousands of Jordanians by these countries following the war of the Gulf, the saturation of the administration, the economic recession during the Nineties affected these cities and their provinces harshly. The rate of poverty and unemployment (in particular the unemployment of young people) during the last 15 years knew a very sharp increase and is much higher today than that in the area of Amman (Cf Jordan Poverty Assessment, World Bank, 2004).

In this context, local development constitutes for these cities and regions and for their population a major stake. Such a perspective supposes the mobilization of institutions, populations and local resources. However, the quasi totality of the municipalities does not play any part in the fight against poverty and in the social and economic development of their cities. Several municipalities are strongly challenged by associations and by the local populations who reproach them for not being interested in the social condition of their constituency, and question even the legitimacy and the representativity of the Town councils.

2.2 THE CHALLENGES OF URBAN MUTATION AND SOCIAL RE-COMPOSITION

The movement of accelerated urbanization that Jordan knew since the beginning of the 1970, combined with the demographic growth and the migratory waves of the populations, deeply transformed the socio-spatial structures of the country and often made null and void the definitions and administrative categorizations of the "cities" and the "villages". The villages saw the considerable growth of their population, many news cities were born, small cities extended to include the surrounding villages, which also became urbanized, etc.

This transformation is not only the result of an "endogenous" demographic growth, which would have affected each locality as a result of the increase in its own population. It is also the effect of migratory movements of great amplitude which, far from being reduced to only the exodus towards Amman, had affected all the Jordanian localities: migrations from small villages towards bigger villages; migrations towards the small cities; migrations towards the few large cities; migrations from Palestinian camps towards the surrounding localities and to the large cities; sedentarization of tribes and pastoralists, nomads or semi-nomads. Moreover the State itself, in an effort to hold its influence on the territory, was at the origin of the creation of many small cities: towns of sedentarization such as Jafr and Hussainiyah; mining cities for phosphates and potash such as Hasa, El-Abyad, Shidiya, Ghor and Safi; road towns or railway crossroads such as Jiza, Qatrana or Qwira, etc.

The upheaval of the socio-spatial structures is also related to the swarming and the diffusion of the urban reality to the smallest rural localities. The massive emigration towards the oil countries and the important transfer of resources which benefited the families and the localities of origin; the uprooting and the urban culture of the population of Palestinian origin (which constitutes more than half of the Jordanian population) of which a great part came from the cities and urban areas; investments of the State and the transfers which it affected towards the "rural" localities with an aim of reinforcing their social base and of securing the loyalty of the population of trans-Jordanian origin; the transformation of economic activities and the prevalence of urban...
activities of services on the expense of agricultural activities, even in the small rural villages, etc, are many phenomena which strongly contributed to this process of diffusion of urbanization.

In short, in all of the Jordanian localities, the spatial and urban morphology, the way of life and consumption, the socio-economic structures, the social and collective forms of organization were strongly affected and transformed.

In this context, it is not exaggerated to say that all the Jordanian localities are, to some extent, new cities, which are formed by the assembly of various, more or less uprooted, groups, or "parts" brought back and juxtaposed. The local collectivities and communities, as collective structures having their formal and informal standards of organization, operation and regulation are far from being already accomplished or from being given realities in advance.

Even in the case of the "historical cities" such as Madaba, Ajloun, Jerash, and to a lesser degree, Karak and Salt, Irbid and Aqaba, these local communities are rather realities in the course of construction and achievement through processes, which, still today, are far from being completed.

Admittedly, and contrary to the cities which resulted from the urbanization of rural villages or those which were created ex-nihilo by the State to respond to a precise function (town of sedentarization, mines city, garrisons cities, etc), the historical cities have a relatively old urban tradition and patrimony:

- An urban structure marked by the existence of historic cores which have an architectural and patrimonial value and which, despite everything, still keep to a certain degree a function of public federator spaces, and their function of economic, social and urban centrality;
- A collective identity and memory strongly rooted and attached to the city and its patrimony; an old commercial and artisanal tradition which was built through multiple networks of exchange and communication with Palestine and even Syrian towns;
- A middle-class and liberal professionals who, although often carrying out their activities in the capital city, continue to occupy an important position in the local social structure; and have a relatively advanced level of education;
- A culture and an identity which affirm their urbanity and which dissociate themselves from a "Bedouin" culture locked up in a tribal order;
- A tradition of intercommunal, inter-confessional and interethnic coexistence, communication and "live-together"
- Collective authorities and mechanisms of self-dependence and self-regulation, which although being based on familial hierarchies and linkages, built a community framework which went beyond the tribal framework and "family business";
- A political culture which made of these cities the cradles for political parties and nationalistic and left wing movements;
- A tradition of collective municipal management, which goes back to the Ottoman period.

However, all of the phenomena evoked previously (urban development, demographic growth, massive arrival of populations of Palestinian and/or rural origin, etc.) as well as the socioeconomic evolutions and socio-political of the Jordanian society have upset and transformed the socio-spatial structures of these cities and have put under question the various components of their socio-urban traditions, to a point that makes it possible to speak today about "cities in mutation and transition" and "local communities in the course of re-composition and re-organization".
2.3 MUNICIPALITIES: TERRITORIAL COLLECTIVITIES OR ADMINISTRATIVE ENTITIES?

In spite of the principle of autonomy of the municipal institution and in spite of the will for decentralization affirmed by the Government from the end of the Eighties, the Municipalities are today deprived of their political and institutional autonomy and are still under the authority and the control of the Government.

The designation of the Mayors and half of the town councilors is undoubtedly the most salient aspect of this loss of autonomy. However, the authority of the Ministry is also exerted through the appointment of the “zone directors” who are given the responsibility of managing, under the authority of the Mayor and the Town council, the communal territories which had, before merging, the status of municipality or village councils. This authority is also exerted through the appointment of the members of the “municipal committees” – nomination, which appears, in a way or another, like an administrative designation carried out under the control of the ministerial departments. Finally, it is to this Ministry that this personnel is accountable rather than to the local population, which is deprived of any formal authority of control and influence.

This loss of autonomy was justified by the multidimensional crisis of the municipalities and the will to staff the municipalities with qualified people having the capacity to rectify this situation.

However, as several analysts and observers highlight, the passage from election to appointment of the mayors and town councilors, as well as the amendment of the provisions of the Law of Municipalities, were also especially motivated by the concern of the Government of keeping the political scene under control, particularly in a context marked by an upraise in the popularity of the Islamic party which gained control of several municipalities during the last local elections. It was also a question of keeping a certain “balance” threatened in certain cities by the demographic weight and political growth of the populations of Palestinian origin. It is this same concern for political and demographic “balance” which underlies the principle of “management” based on the territorial delimitation of municipalities and the amendment of the Law which authorizes the Government to subdivide the communal territories in zones and to determine for each one of them the number of councilors to elect.

Whatever the motives were, it is clear that these measures and provisions lead to a situation where the municipal institution is put under some kind of supervision, and to an administrative construction and delimitation of the communal territory, on the expense of the social relations and practices which structure it. At the same time, this contributes to the weakening of the cohesion of the local communities and to digging a hiatus between the municipal institution and the local community.

Moreover, the distance between the Municipality and the local population is reinforced by the almost-general absence of instituted mechanisms of dialogue, participation and accountability. Indeed, rare are the municipalities, which set up district committees of consultation as stated by the Law of Municipalities.

Few municipalities make the effort to inform the local population of their projects and their decisions by organizing, for example, public meetings, by publishing a newsletter, or by making the meetings of the Town Council accessible to the public as envisaged by Law. For some “engineers”, this defect of not involving the public is even combined sometimes, with certain contempt of the local “illiterate” population, and of the municipal councilors elected by them. Thus, one of these “engineers, zone director” does not hesitate to declare his contempt even in the presence of the mayor and the majority of the members of the Town Council: “These people should be managed! They are not apt to be self-managed. It would have been necessary to designate even all of the Town council!” With such attitudes, should not we consider that there is a cause and effect relationship, at least partially, between the defect of not soliciting the participation of the population and the negative attitude which sometimes the population declares, and which one of the Mayors describes when he says: “people consider the municipality as their enemy who is there only to control them and make them pay infringements”? Could such a feeling be only explained by the fact that “the requests of people relate more to their particular interests than to the general interest”? 
The way in which the local populations and certain associations sometimes try to force their way onto the municipal policy and management is in this respect particularly significant: sometimes rather than addressing the Town Hall, they prefer to directly challenge the Minister ("the employer of the Mayor" as a president of a local association put it), the Governor or the deputies to complain or to make their voices heard. Thus, the Municipality is sometimes perceived as a decentralized administration rather than an institution representative of the local community. This situation creates a "feeling of illegitimacy" and weakens the Town Councils and their local authority. It is what undoubtedly explains the insistence of certain mayors, who had been elected before being designated, on the fact that, they unlike the "other mayors", had been chosen by the population and not by the Administration. One can also note that some of these "elected" Mayors use and highlight this "legitimacy" to affirm their local authority as well as to safeguard or keep a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the Official Authorities.

2.3.1 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF URBAN CENTRALITY AND THE QUESTION OF URBAN INTEGRATION

After the demographic transformation and the institutional reorganization, the secondary cities in Jordan have become mosaics of disparate, juxtaposed territories. It is a major challenge to establish a new connecting bond amongst these otherwise disconnected realities. Historic cores are centrifugal spaces, due to social and physical decay. The challenge is to re-establish the cores as centripetal hubs of attraction, connection, link and communication amongst the different territories of the city. In other words, the right of access to the city is to be returned to the inhabitant, namely to the young people and to disadvantaged groups.

2.3.2 PUBLIC SPACE AS A FEDERATOR PLACE OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND COMMUNICATION

Nowadays, the historic core is a centrifugal space, due to its social and physical decay. The challenge is to re-establish the core as a centripetal place of attraction, connection, link and communication amongst the different territories of the city. In other words, the right of access to the city is to be returned to the inhabitant, namely to the young people and to disadvantaged groups. This will happen, if the program succeeds in reinforcing the urban integration in a federating space, a space of urban and economic centrality. The historic core, restored as public space of social encounter and communication, will create the conditions for a mutual knowledge and acknowledgement amongst the different communities and amongst the different ages and genders.

2.3.3 THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL COHESION

Facing the prevalence of community and neo-tribal logics and the increased risks of social fragmentation between the various groups, which constitute the cities, the role of the city, its community and its institutions in the reinforcement of social cohesion is determining. It should be indeed the vocation of the municipalities to be independent authorities that represent the collective interests and construct a shared vision for the common good. In this vision, the city should be the space for dialogue and participation of the groups and the population in the local policy. Furthermore, the municipality could constitute the indispensable framework where the relationship between the various groups are negotiated, and even more, where these groups go beyond their particular interests to be organized as collective actors able to assume their responsibilities and to face their common problems. This question is all the more crucial today that the municipalities, since their merging, group several local localities and communities.

However, a fast examination of the recent history of the institutions and local political economy in the "historical cities" shows that the majority of the Municipalities, instead of working for the reinforcement of social cohesion, are often contributing to the aggravation of divisions and cleavages between the various local groups.

The type of relationship established by the State with the local and tribal groups and the prevalence of the logic of "rent" and clientelism as means of social mobility, and of access to power and richness, etc., had very negative effects on the local institutions. They strongly contributed
to the transformation of the municipalities and the municipal institutions from an autonomous and independent entities, where the various groups negotiate and build a consensus around the collective interest, to an exclusive object for appropriation allowing such or such a group to affirm its authority and to draw some material and symbolic profits on the expense of other groups and, obviously, on the expense of the general interest and the common good. (cf the example of Madaba).
3. **Madaba Social Assessment**

3.1 **INTRODUCTION**

In Madaba, the present is clearly caught between memory and history. Compared to other “historical” towns, such as Karak, Ajloun, Salt or Irbid, without mentioning the towns in the Middle East that date back to several thousands of years, Madaba still appears to be a new town. Like Jarash, with its Circassian migrants, it has developed in an “American- way” ever since the 1870s, when some Christian tribes from Karak settled on the ruins of the ancient town that had been abandoned over one thousand years before. The Karki tribes were soon to be joined by other migrants, who individually or collectively, starting from Salt, but also from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and even Egypt, came to take up residence in this new little urban melting pot in the middle of Badya (the land of nomadism), on the eastern shore of River Jordan.

A magnet for the surrounding rural and pastoral region, the town grew steadily from a population of almost 2 thousand people at the beginning of the twenties, to approximately 13 000 at the end of the sixties, and around 70 000 today.

The history of Madaba is therefore quite recent. It is one of the last towns to have been created prior to the constitution of the Emirate and the Kingdom, before the extraordinarily fast development of Amman. It therefore represents one of the most recent evidences of Ottoman urbanism.

Yet memory and history are at the heart of the current urban issues, more so than anywhere else. No reference could be made to the “historical” centre of the town, its preservation, rehabilitation and revitalisation, without the different groups’ and communities’ immediately underscoring memory and history to justify and direct any action envisaged. Here history and memory are not simple and consensual, smoothly conveyed to us by the passing of time. Instead history and memory have been completely processed, deconstructed and reconstructed by the present, with its contradictions and controversies, to become topical issues.

Disagreements on memory and history or in other words the tension between collective memory and history on the one hand, and the memories and histories of communities, on the other, are closely linked to the current urban and “living together” crisis that is affecting the town: strain and collapse of urban centrality, social and urban fragmentation and decomposition; crisis of the local governing bodies and of the collective social forms and mechanisms of control; degradation of public spaces that are taken over by different communities, etc.

The crisis is evident in the groups’ and communities’ inclination to “go back” to their “origins”, however mythical they may be, to reconstruct and redefine their identities and boundaries exclusively on the basis of their lineage, religious or confessional belonging.

This crispsation on identity and community is first observed in the predominance of stories that highlight the memory and history in the town of the different communities – perceived as distinct homogeneous and entities irrespective of the historical context - rather than the collective history and memory of the town. Some, or even most of these stories consider that the memory and history of a given community embody, in themselves only, the memory and history of the whole town. They exclude, thus, the others by giving them the status of eternal strangers or backups who do nothing but camp on the outskirts of a symbolic space. In such a competition in which origin and anteriority are the only legitimate terms of reference, to the detriment of the social and historical contexts, the different community stories look identical in structure and ways of construction. The only difference is the choice of the legitimate origin and the community (-ies) conferred with the position of illegitimate stranger in the various memories and histories of the town.

Such is the case of some of the community-based stories shared by the three Christian lineage groups: the legitimate origin is the foundation of the city and the legitimate groups are those
that participated in the foundation. Origin and anteriority are sometimes dated back to imme-
memorial times, long before the foundation of the current town. Claiming as evidence a Christian
archaeological find (the Map), some of the stories date the legitimate origin of the town back to
the birth of Christianity that apparently bestowed the city with its final identity. Never mind the
over one thousand year historical vacuum or silence, considered at the most a mere interrup-
tion, or a slight fracture, soon mended by the recent “re-foundation” of the town upon the ruins
of the former one. In the same perspective, whatever groups may have been involved in “re-
found” the town, “Christian identity” is sufficient to appoint them as the legitimate heirs, be-
yond any historicity…

These stories are mirrored by others that are just as community-centred: they tend to minimise
both the foundation and the history of the town, focusing on the precedence in the region of
“Muslim tribes”. In these stories, Christian tribes are depicted as newcomers whose legitimacy
is questioned by the fact that the territory they received from the Ottoman authorities belonged
to the local tribes.

This crisptation on identity and community is also expressed in the transformation of the his-
torical centre into an object of real and symbolic competition: the problems underlying dis-
courses and practices often pertain to the “sense of belonging” of the centre, its “appropriation”
and “invasion”. Does this imply that after having been renovated and revitalised, the historical
centre must be “returned” to the community that made it the heart of its own collective memory
and today feels invaded, dispossessed, forced to become a minority, or else consecrate the
dispossession and forced minority position by other communities that could claim exclusive
rights over it? These are the alternatives imposed on us today by the strategies of community
isolation whose rational is based exclusively on origin and lineage.

What is then evacuated, excluded and forgotten by the communitarian discourses and prac-
tices is precisely the share of history as well as the urbaniy of the city, i.e. this common urban
and multi-communitarian experience which was constituted with the city and which, more or
less, made it possible to go beyond the origins and the lineages, to transcend the borders and
the exclusive community memberships.

What is the solution to this community-based rational and the impossible choices entailed?
How can we overcome the equivalence or correspondence between identity and territory
which, when applied to the historical centre, has no other implication but the end of urban cen-
trality and public spaces? Unlike the appropriation and invasion rational, centrality and public
spaces can only be built upon diversity and accessibility, or accessibility in the context of diver-
sity (Ulf Hannerz).

How and in what conditions could the revitalisation of the historical centre contribute towards
reconstructing urban centrality and public spaces, and, in the long run, social and urban cohe-
sion and integration?

These are the questions and concerns that underlie the following analysis.

Let us first reconsider the history of Madaba, without wanting to redefine the past, or even less
to unravel the truths underlying the community-centred stories on the town and its history.
Rather, we must try and understand the driving forces that structured the town, both in terms of
social organisation and stratification, and its configuration in space.

Starting from the « history of the present », the analysis will then focus upon the different fac-
tors underlying the current urban crises, pinpointing the issues linked to the revitalisation of
the historical centre, and how this could boost the social, economic and urban development proc-

3.2 FROM TRIBAL ORDER TO THE BIRTH OF A VILLAGE

In 1871, around 800 people belonging to three Christian tribes emigrated from Karak and settled on the ruins of the ancient town of Madaba. We do not have the exact figures. At the time, tribes were “measured” according to the number of men capable and old enough to carry weapons. The tribes that arrived in Madaba were made up as follows: the Azayzat, with 62 armed men; the Karadsheh, 44, and the Ma’ aya, 44.

The Azayzat tribe was the most active in launching the initial settlement project, which can be explained by several factors: - the conflicts within the tribal confederation reigning in Karak; - the periodic conflicts with the town tribes and the Bedouin tribes in the region where the Ottoman Empire had difficulties in enforcing its authority on nomadism; - the Azayzat desire of independence from the other Christian tribe in Karak, the Halsa, which, thanks to its demographic development, i.e. the number of its weapons, was becoming more and more dominant, while the Azayzat believed that “honour and nobleness” entitled their tribe to be at the head of the Christian tribal hierarchy, or even of the Muslim tribes in Karak, including the influential tribe of the Majali. According to the stories told by the Azayzat, prophet Mohammad himself consecrated their eminent position by giving their ancestor his name of honour (Aziz: the honourable) following the important role they apparently played in the Muslim conquest of the region. Never mind the clash between the story and historical chronology, and the fact that the tribe was Christian: it is the tribal order, with its genealogy and code of honour that represents the foundation for classification, cohesion and differentiation. The conversion of the Azayzat from Orthodoxy to Catholicism, a few years prior to their departure from Karak, is part of the same classification and differentiation strategy: they refused to pray under the order of an Orthodox priest from the Halasa tribe, which drove them to the Catholic mission in Jerusalem that was willing to appoint one of theirs a priest.

This conversion to Catholicism did not prevent the Azayzat from convincing the other two Orthodox tribes, the Karadsheh and the Ma’ aya, with which they had established tribal alliances, to follow them and settle with them in Madaba. It is interesting to note that a small part of the Azayzat kept its affiliation to the Orthodox Church, without jeopardizing the solidarity and cohesion of the tribal group.

However, the Latin patriarchate played the leading role in the foundation of Madaba, which did not merely consist in negotiating with the Ottoman authorities and obtaining land for the Catholic tribe. The Catholic missionaries actually organised the village space. The Latin Church in Jerusalem was fundamental in achieving the project, in stabilising, organising and developing the community. The Ottoman authorities also had an important role, when facing the stir within the nomadic tribes and the desertification process, they encouraged the settlement of agricultural colonies and the development of villages and urban centres on the eastern shore of the Jordan with the intention of creating a network of villages that would support their policy of populating and settling the area, developing agriculture and communication networks between Palestine, on the one hand, and Syria and Hijaz, on the other. Thus, the settlement of Christian tribes and the development of Madaba were part of an extensive movement to encourage the settling process and the multiplication of villages thanks to the arrival of migrants, namely Chechens, Turkmen and Circassians - like in Jarah, Zarqa and Amman -, Christians and Muslims from Syria and Palestine. Thus, beside the birth and development of Madaba, several villages, agricultural colonies and urban centres were created at the end of the 19th century, namely: Jarash, Zarqa, Amman, Ma’in, Kfira, Wadi Essir, Hasban, etc.

With the exception of Amman that enjoyed extraordinary growth and development following the foundation of the Emirate and of the Kingdom, Madaba was the fastest in building and affirming its central position and urban nature among all the areas that were to be populated.

3.3 FROM A VILLAGE TO A TOWN: THE HEART OF AN URBAN STRUCTURE

Madaba, particularly its historical centre, is still strongly marked by its initial emergence and development conditions, following the settlement, in 1870, of the three Christian tribes from
Karak on the ancient ruins of the town. In its urban morphology, ownership or even residential structure, the city still bears the signs of the social and spatial organisation that took root progressively in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century, as it became an urban area for the surrounding region.

The order in which the historical heart of the town was created and developed remained the same for almost one century, despite the rapid development of the town and its population, and was challenged only at the end of the nineteen-seventies, unleashing an urban crisis the town is currently trying to overcome.

The structure and spatial morphology of the village that took shape at the end of the nineteenth century and that were to become the heart of the historical centre of the town, reflect the tribal/lineage social organisation of the time. The land initially given to the Azayzat by the Latin Patriarchate was divided among the three tribes, with the support and under the supervision of the Catholic missionaries. These Latin missionaries had already identified the area that was to become the religious centre of the village, where they built a chapel that was later turned into a church, namely the area situated on top of the hill (the acropolis). Its position overhanging the surroundings gave it a kind of spatial and symbolic centrality. The Latin missionaries' concern about the tribal order was connected to that of gathering the Azayzat in a distinct and homogeneous area to ensure their faithfulness, preventing any possible return to orthodoxy, and to guide and control them more effectively.

Thus, the land situated to the South and South-East of the acropolis was given to the Azayzat Catholic tribe; the area in the North-West was attributed to the Karadsheh, while the Ma'aya received the north-eastern part.

The land surface attributed to each of the tribes was determined according to the number of family heads: 48 “khaneh”, or lots, were given to the Azayzat, 45 to the Karadsheh and 38 to the Ma'aya. These were to form the three distinct social and residential units that existed as from the foundation of the village. The organisation of space within each of these units was also established according to family and alliance relations: each tribal sub-group therefore had its own “Haouch” that contained several households with direct family relations.

Furthermore, the land given to each of the tribes included agricultural land situated next to their residential areas: the agricultural lots of the Azayzat in the South, those of the Karadsheh and the Ma'aya respectively in the North-West and North-East.

This initial spatial organisation was completed by the following: (i) in 1891, the Catholic church of St. John was built at the top of the acropolis, followed by the Latin school near the church; (ii) administrative buildings were erected, namely the police station in 1892, and the Saraya in 1896; (iii) the Orthodox Church of St. Georges was built at the northern entrance to the village, near the junction separating the land of the two orthodox tribes. This structure represented the main communication route from the acropolis to the Orthodox Church, running between the territories of the two orthodox tribes.

This route progressively became the main shopping street in the Ottoman village and the town of Madaba.
The spatial organisation established according to lineage and confessional identity turned out to be extraordinarily stable. It was challenged neither by the demographic increase of the three Christian tribes, nor by the transformation of Madaba into an urban centre attracting a growing number of migrants.

Right until the beginning of the seventies, in other words almost one century following the village foundation, each of the three groups preserved the unity and homogeneity of its residential territory or its “community neighbourhood”. The fact that each of the groups owned agricultural land next to its residential space allowed the latter to extend progressively according to the demographic requirements. Thus, a property inventory in 1968 confirmed the great stability of the three community-centred territories that extended from their original cores without losing their unity or homogeneity (see the plan below).

Thus the town of Madaba developed and grew in more or less concentric circles starting from the above-mentioned territories, but especially around them. In fact, until the early seventies, the successive population flows that arrived in the town were distributed in and around the centre, according to the same community organisation principles.

The “primary” family relations remained the structuring principle of the residential space and urban morphology. The town grew like a mosaic in a series of juxtaposed territories, established according to family relations and/or confessional proximity or background.
The stability was fundamental in the transformation of the tribal groups into deeply rooted territorial communities. In fact, these territories were much more than residential spaces: they were actual “milieus for living together”. Their trans-generational and lengthy stability, the coexistence within one area of neighbourhood of family (real and “fictitious”) and community relations, made of them constituting elements for the cohesion of groups, their identities and their family and collective memories.

Despite the transitional crisis experienced by the historical centre and the degradation of its urban fabric (commercial and residential), despite the fact that a consistent part of the families from the three communities now live outside the historical centre, these territories are still today characterised by the same stability in property: families may chose to move to Amman, Ma’in or the new residential areas of Madaba, however they tend to keep their property and refuse to sell it, so strong is their attachment to these important references to their family and collective memory.

Does the continuing ascendance of family relations involve the permanence of a tribalism that may even have been re-enforced as a principle of social organisation? Many elements do prove this continuity: - the permanence of lineage relations to consolidate the constrictive basis of the groups and their identities; - the persistence of residential segregation processes and the permanence of lineage and family relations explaining the foundation of the territory, and more generally, of the entire urban morphology; - the re-enforcement of lineage groups through their confessional backgrounds that are ever more often used as identity markers, an internal cohesion and differentiation factor among the different groups; - the continuing importance of the lineage sense of belonging in marriages and the rareness of “mixed marriages” - not only...
between Muslims and Christians, but also between Catholics and Orthodox Catholics; - the determining role of the lineage principle in political divisions and alliances, as was the case in the two latest legislative elections – the election of the Christian deputy entailed a competition between the two most important lineage groups, the Azayzat and the Karadsheh who even organised an “internal primary election” to appoint a single candidate to represent each of the two groups… Does this mean that nothing has changed in over a century, and that the tribal social organisation and order that prevailed when the village of Madaba was founded at the end of the nineteenth century still determine social relations and the urban set-up of the town?

In fact, stability and fixedness are only apparent. Like other traditional Arab towns, Madaba has certainly not evolved towards a social and urban structure based on the dissolution of lineage groups and the melting of communities and populations. However, the solid prevalence of family relations and of a community organised according to lineage, went hand in hand with the in-depth transformation in terms of lifestyles, social organisation and the identity of the different groups. Nevertheless, due to the effects of the settling down process and urbanisation, the persistence of communitarian neighbourhoods was accompanied by constant changes in the territories or “milieus of living together”: their identity, their “spirit” and the underlying forms of sociability changed from one generation to the next. Under the apparent stability of community-centred territories, Madaba went from a tribal to an urban structure characterised by a growing diversification of populations, activities and lifestyles, and by increased interaction, imitations and exchanges among the different groups and communities. In other words, the different territories and communities forming the urban mosaic are neither airtight enclaves nor bunkers: within the exchange space representing the town, the above are constantly processed and transformed by the mixing and tensions of urban life. Unlike the tribes that in their perpetual movement were socially and culturally relatively stable, the lineage communities in Madaba were under constant influence of several forms of economic, social and cultural mobility. In other words, in Madaba, like in most towns of the Middle-East, there is “multi-community urbanism” where mixing and mobility has led to “coexistence” rather than individual cosmopolitanism and the dissolution of groups and “ethnic” territories – established according to real or fictitious family relations – and to a system of inter-community exchange and interaction that has transformed and mixed the cultures and lifestyles of the different communities, though without causing their dissolution.

Hence the extreme importance of the public spaces of the town, in other words those that have not been controlled or taken over by one group or another, that have thus become places of intercommunity interaction and exchanges.

In this perspective, the urbanity of the communities – and in the end of the town itself – cannot be measured in terms of residential inter-penetration and the dissolution of primary relations – whether of lineage or confessional – but by their capacity to create together areas of exchange and public action, to set-up collective and concerted forms and ways for managing and taking charge of themselves.

Nevertheless, the urbanisation process cannot be taken for granted or seen as established once and for all. Rather, it is the outcome of a fragile, crisis-prone, ongoing process that can collapse or be interrupted. Like in the case of Madaba, such crises are evident in the degradation of public spaces, the shrinking of areas for collective action, the withdrawal of the communities into their territories and identities.

### 3.4 Development of Urban Activities and Construction of a Social Order

In Madaba, or anywhere else, creating a village will not its natural evolution into an urban centre. The birth of a town and the development of urban life go hand in hand with a series of challenges, fractures and transformations: - fractures from the tribal order and agricultural and pastoral activities; - development of new economic, commercial, craft and agricultural activities within the context of the urban market; birth of a market whose attraction and influence reach far beyond the town boundaries to a wide area in which the town can impose its goods, weights and measures, and even its money lenders; - stirring of a large migratory area to meet
the town’s constant need for men and women - workers and farmers, but also tradesmen and qualified craftsmen -; development of economic and cultural exchange networks to introduce the town into an urban network; resolution of tribal conflicts and constitution of a social and political order and local governance mechanisms… Another issue is the development of Madaba in a prevalently nomadic context: the town had to develop its urban activities while dealing with tribes that in most cases had not even initiated their settling process.

The progress achieved by the three tribes that originally founded the town is extraordinary. Nothing had predisposed them initially for the destiny they constructed. Their urban experience was more than rudimental. Though they originally came from Karak, the town was at the time going through economic and urban cultural decadence. Nomadism was spurred by the lengthy absence of control and effective authority of the central power over the region of Karak and the entire eastern shore of the Jordan, thus upsetting and weakening the exchange circuit that had set the town within the urban context, with a consequent decline in urban activities and life, increasingly invasive and turbulent pastoral tribalism giving rise to the conflicts that caused the Christian tribes to settle in Madaba. From a social, cultural and lifestyle point of view, the differences between the Christians settled in Madaba and some of the semi-sedentary tribes in the surroundings were limited. Furthermore, almost all were illiterate, like for example the Sheik of the Karadcheh tribe, Ibrahim Jmay’an, who headed the municipality of Madaba from 1916 to 1919, and from 1923 to 1926. As far as resources were concerned, apart from the land received from the Ottoman authorities and the flocks they had brought with them from Karak, they practically had no economic capital… In barely four decades, the three Christian tribes achieved an extraordinary social, economic and cultural transformation, with the urbanisation of living conditions and lifestyles, the transition from a rural pastoral economy to an urban economy where they dominated as landowners and tradesmen, and later as professional people. High cultural mobility displayed in the thirties and forties by the large number of people who successfully completed higher education studies. In-depth transformation of the status and role of women translated into the general schooling of girls as from the end of the 19th century, the high number of women who held diplomas and the major role of women associations as from the early fifties…

3.4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

Towns are often opposed to the country, agricultural activities to rural activities, while the country is considered as having preceded towns chronologically, while the development of agriculture enabled urban development. Yet this simple, not to say simplistic picture does not always correspond to historical facts, especially in those regions, like Jordan, characterised by an invasive presence of nomadism. In fact, agricultural development often entails the conjunction of the efforts of a town – even in an embryonic state – and a political authority to clear an area of the dominance of nomads, protect it, and develop agriculture while encouraging the settling process, to later introduce the agricultural products into the trade circuits. Hence, the development in Madaba of agriculture, commercial and urban activities went hand in hand, following a trend of reciprocal presupposition and consolidation. One could even say that ever since the settling of the Christian tribes and the constitution of a stable human group able to protect its interests, the Ottoman policy and the constitution of a commercial network between Madaba and the other Syrian and Palestinian towns were the driving force of the development of agricultural and urban activities.

In fact, the protection of the Ottoman authorities was even more determining considering that the land given to the three Karaki tribes was part of the territory of the Bani Sakhr tribe that had used it as pastures. The intervention of the Pasha of Naplouse Pasha and of the police from Salt was often requested to defuse property conflicts. Later, in 1893, the Ottoman authorities appointed a permanent “director” and established a police station to ensure the protection of the village.

Another determining factor that ensured a certain balance of power between the new town and its surroundings that were characterised by pastoral nomadism lay in the cohesion, the “esprit de corps” (‘Assabyah) and solidarity displayed by each of the groups of Christian lineage. In this case, the permanent cohesion of groups belonging to the same lineage must not be perceived as the remains of a lifestyle and tribal organisation, but rather a reconstructed and rede-
fined organisational model within a strictly urban context, vital for the protection it offers to agricultural and urban activities, including commercial activities whose network and development imply a greater feeling of security both for the territory of the new town and for the exchange and communication networks and circuits setup with the other towns. The very protection and security offered explains how important the development of Madaba was for the Ottoman authorities, not only to encourage the settlement process and the agricultural and commercial development of the town and its surroundings, but also to create a base to extend their authority over Salt and Karak, and to ensure the security of the exchange and communication routes between the Syrian and the Palestinian towns. An explanation of why the railway linking Damascus to Hedjaz, built at the end of the nineteenth century and inaugurated in 1900, had a station approximately twenty kilometres east of Madaba.

Commercial activities developed rapidly following the settlement of the Karaki tribes. Like in most Jordanian towns, in Jarash and Karak particularly, such growth was boosted by the Syrian (the Shamis), and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinian tradesmen – principally from Naplouse –. They travelled to the village to trade cattle, wheat and barley, thus connecting Madaba and its surroundings to the Syrian and Palestinian towns (especially Naplouse).

The market value of agricultural products (namely wheat and barley) also encouraged them to extend their agricultural land, either by establishing partnership agreements with the tribes living in the surroundings, according to which they would have the land of these tribes farmed by calling upon fellahs and farm workers, or by increasing their property ownership through the purchase of new arable land.

Very soon, the Karaki tribes, and more particularly the Azayzat and the Kardsheh became the owners of large properties thanks to the Ottoman policy aimed at fighting nomadism and favouring the settling-process and the development of agriculture, and to their participation in commercial activities.

As for the Ottoman policy, the following initiatives were taken during the second half of the XIX century, with determining effects on the development of Madaba and the construction of a social and economic hierarchy: - obligation to record property ownership in the land registry and to pay recording expenses and a yearly tax in cash; - de facto obligation to farm land not yet registered so as to maintain property and user rights, for any land that had not been farmed for three years automatically became “amiri” land, in other words belonging to the Sultan; - the possibility for a person who farmed the land and paid the tax to be acknowledged as its proprietor, even if the land did not belong to him previously… Here are some of the effects of such measures: the tribes near Madaba were encouraged, not to say obliged, to cultivate their customary land, either themselves, or with the help of fellahin and hartines from Palestine, or even by establishing agreements with the Christian families of Madaba who would then take charge of the farming; the farmers and the tribes were encouraged, not to say obliged, to sell their land, sometimes at a low cost, if they could or would not pay the registry expenses and/or the yearly property tax; the development of usury (in order to pay the taxes, the tribes, and especially the farmers, often had to borrow money or even pledge their property to purchase seeds). The activity, known at the time in Salt and in the other Jordan and Palestinian towns as “Talah”, in which the experts were the rich families and/or tradesmen of the Christian tribes that thus not only accumulated large profits, but also considerably extended their properties to the detriment of the farmers and Bedouins who were often dispossessed of their land because of borrowing incapacity.

All these factors contributed towards both the settling process and social and economical level-
ling out. Several villages developed in the surroundings of Madaba thanks to the settlement of nomadic tribes that were ever more often directly or indirectly involved in cultural activity. The settling, agricultural and trade development processes were tightly connected to the growing migration flow towards Madaba and its surroundings. It essentially concerned poor peasants who had come as agricultural labourers to farm the arable lands of the tribes and the ever more extensive lands of the most important owners in Madaba. Most of the fellas came from Palestinian villages – especially the Christian villages of Beit Jala, Bethlehem or Ramallah, but also from the Muslim villages in the regions of Naplouse and Jerusalem.

The relative safety and agricultural development also attracted a considerable number of individuals and families, mostly Christians, from Karak (for example the Hihazin, and later the Haddadin), from Salt, but also from Lebanon and Palestine; they purchased land or reached agreements with the Muslim tribes in the Madaba region to farm their land.

The settlement/migration process was to increase quickly throughout the first half of the twentieth century. As from the fifties, it was followed by a movement of rural exodus towards Madaba that, through its activities and services, had become a strong magnet for the entire region.

The involvement of the Christian families of Madaba in trade activity dates back to the end of the nineteenth century, following a double process: to learn from and imitate the Shamis tradesmen settled in Madaba, and to establish links and networks to insert their trade activities (including caravan trade) into a trade circuit connecting Madaba to the other urban centres.

Here again, the development of trading activity and the consequent differences in terms of capital depend on the distribution of social capital, in others words on the extension, cohesion and notoriousness of the lineage groups. Thus, trading networks were set-up thanks to family relations, but especially to the marriage relations that each of the lineage groups developed with Christian families or groups from other towns. Marriages were organised not only according to confessional backgrounds (Catholic/Orthodox), but also according to social classification that took into account the notoriousness of the lineage groups, the position of the families within these groups, and their urban origin. Thus, for the Azayzat and the Karadsheh families, the most valued alliances were those established with the Christian families from Salt, Palestinian or Lebanese towns. In other words, being part of both matrimonial and trade networks represented a “family business” based on the social hierarchy of the lineage order, thus contributing to its reproduction. In addition to the purchase and accumulation of farmland, the richest tradesmen in town were families or lineage segments belonging to the Azayzat and Karadsheh.

This extension of family relations was also a way through which forms of commercial cooperation were set-up, associating tradesmen from Madaba to those of other towns (such as for example the trade and matrimonial relations between certain Karadsheh families and branches of the Abou Jaber family from Salt). All this happened as though the urbanisation of the Christian tribes had occurred through the incorporation of women, individuals and families that had emigrated to Madaba from urban centres. In fact, the women from Salt and Palestine were fundamental in creating women’s associations and social, educational and cultural activities in Madaba.

Agricultural and trade development went hand in hand with the development of local crafts thanks to the arrival of skilled migrants. The three Christian tribes that settled in Madaba had hardly any craftsmen among their members. The same was true in the villages and tribes in the surrounding region. So when the Latin Patriarchate started building the Catholic Church in 1894, it brought along material, bricklayers and the stonecutters from Palestine. The arrival of artisans swelled especially from the beginning of the twentieth century as urban activities increased and the Christian tribes became richer. The notables started replacing their semi-rural houses by urban ones, built according to the style prevailing in Naplouse and Jerusalem: two-storied freestone houses, with inner arches, wrought iron windows and large façades. These houses were more or less monumental according to the families’ wealth, while the preference for town clothes instead of the characteristic Bedouin attires, showed that the lifestyles were already considerably affected by the urbanisation trend at the beginning of the century…

To meet the growing needs deriving from the development and urbanisation of lifestyles, the
Palestinian villages and small towns continued until the nineteen-forties to supply Madaba with skilled labour. Many bricklayers and stonecutters came from Bayt Jala, goldsmiths and silversmiths from Gaza... Later, the flow of refugees who arrived in 1948 (around 2000 people) was to represent a source of craftsmen, traders and farm workers.

3.4.2 AN URBAN CENTRALITY SPACE

The urbanisation of Madaba and the development of economic activities led to the need for a central area for all the trading activities. In fact, as from the end of the nineteenth century, the current King Talal Street (the former Manchyeh Street) contained the first trading activities in Madaba. This was the street where the Shamsis tradesmen settled: they opened shop on the ground floor and lived on the first floor. Starting from the King Talal Street, the trading activity then extended to the perpendicular street that was called The New Street (the current “El-Hachemi Street” or “Souk El-Hamaydeh”). Furthermore, a weekly market was held on Fridays on the outskirts of the Ottoman village, in the street that was later given a telling name: the “Friday Street” (the current “King Abdallah Street” or “Lovers Street” as it is called by the local population). Thanks to this trading structure and the Syrian and Christian trade networks, Madaba became a central trading area that attracted the entire region since the beginning of the twentieth century, boosting and accelerating commercial activity within the region, but also with other urban centres. This central space was enhanced in 1919 by the municipality that installed a street lighting system and began paving the main trade streets with stones similar to the ones used in the centre of Jerusalem, Beirut or Alep. In 1925, the centre already had 129 shops (without taking into account the weekly market).

Though it got denser, the same trading structure remained in the same town spaces until the end of 1970.

Like in all traditional Muslim Arab towns, trade areas are par excellence places of communication, exchanges and sociability among the different communities, in other words the public spaces of towns. This was particularly the case of the current “King Talal Street”, a “neutral” area situated in the middle of the community spaces of the three lineage groups, connecting the two community centre (the Church and the Orthodox school in the North, and the Church and Latin schools in the South), which from the very start it contained the public buildings: the Ottoman police headquarters, and later the Saraya, built in 1892, the post and telegraph office erected near the Saraya in 1909, the municipal headquarters (Dar el Baladyah) constructed in 1912 in front of the Saraya. The “King Talal Street” naturally became the space of centrality and multi-community public space.
The multi-community feature was confirmed as from the beginning of the twentieth century, namely with the construction of a mosque in 1907, in the « New Street », near the junction of this street with the souk. In the sixties, a public garden containing a food and beverage service was laid out near the current municipality: for almost twenty years, this garden was one of the main meeting places for the Madaba families… As for the “Friday Street” (currently the “King Abdallah Street”), its borderline position between the residential areas and the historical centre, made it, as from the sixties, a privileged place where the young people of Madaba could meet and stroll, which explains the name it was given by the local population: “Rue Al-‘Oshak (Lovers’ Street). The fact that most of the associations, socio-cultural and sports clubs created as from the sixties are concentrated in this street consolidates its position as a “secondary space” where young people can socialise.

The space structure started to be challenged as from the end of 1970, with the crisis of the town centre and the moving of the centrality functions under the effect of the demographic, urban, social and economic transformation of the town.

3.4.3 A SCHOOLING AND EDUCATIONAL CENTRE

Another powerful driving force in the social and urbanisation transformation process of both the Madaba and its surrounding populations was the creation of schools and educational institutions.

From the end of the nineteenth century, Madaba consolidated its status of educational and cultural centre. The Latin Mission opened the first school in 1883. A Lebanese Maronite teacher was appointed director, while the teachers were recruited in Palestine. The school grew rapidly, first by opening a girls’ section (the first of the kind Trans-Jordan), then by opening two elementary and primary cycles. The girls’ section became a school in itself as from 1919: the teachers were women from Madaba, who after having completed their primary education at the Latin school, had gone to Jerusalem for their secondary studies. The Orthodox Church followed the example of the Latin Mission and opened an elementary school around 1890, which was later to become a primary school. These schools mainly had Latin and Orthodox pupils,
especially the one created by the Latin mission that was famous for its modernity and the quality of its teaching. However, as from the beginning of the twentieth century, the school was attended by a minority of Muslim pupils from the town, but also from the surrounding region.

To understand the advanced and precocious development of Christian schools, bear in mind that it was not before 1925, in other words more than 40 years after the school of the Latin Mission was opened, that the first public primary school was setup in Madaba. Furthermore, the school was the only one in the region and for boys only. Instead the first public secondary school opened in 1956.

Of course the private schools in Madaba only started offering secondary education in the seventies, though they were included from the very start in a network of private schools, thus allowing those pupils whose parents were well-off enough to attend secondary school in other towns, particularly in Jerusalem, and in Amman as from 1930s. Furthermore, before the opening of the public secondary school in Madaba, pupils could attend one of the three public secondary schools in Salt, Karak or Amman. It is also worth mentioning the private technical schools – in Jerusalem- attended by a considerable number of pupils from Madaba.

Education represented social enhancement, which encouraged those families who could afford it to invest in schooling for their children. As from the twenties, a growing number of young people from Madaba travelled to Beirut to attend the University of St. Joseph – for the French-speaking Latins – and the American University – for the English-speaking Orthodox. The movement intensified from the end of the forties, during the transformation of the economic structure of Jordan, namely through the development of the tertiary and decline of the agricultural sector. Access to education became the pathway towards reaching and maintaining a dominant social and economic position, for it gave access both to liberal professions and to the top ranks of the Civil Service. An increasing number of Christian families sold part of their farmland to enable their children to attend university in Lebanon or even in Great Britain or in the United-States.

Education was clearly both a means of social and cultural mobility, and a factor of consolidation for the centrality of Madaba. As from the forties, the town no longer attracted surrounding populations for its market and economic activities, but also for its schools, physicians, lawyers, notaries, technicians and engineers.

The dynamics of education certainly involved the entire population of Madaba and its surroundings. Nevertheless, unequal access to instruction also represented one of the main factors of social differentiation, the establishment of social groups and their hierarchy. While public education was lacking or weak, the private and confessional schools practically held a position of monopoly until the early fifties. These schools certainly did enable a considerable number of Muslim children from Madaba and its surroundings to go to school. However, access to education and the possibility of attending university depended on the social and economic conditions of the families, thus deepening the social and educational gap between the Christian groups and the Muslim population, both in Madaba and in the surroundings. The social and economic differences between the different lineage and confessional groups, and within the groups themselves, were also replicated and reinforced. Access to secondary school and university was de facto a privilege for the families of rich property owners and tradesmen.

It is worth recalling that the public university of Amman did not open until 1962, offering access to a limited number of students. In a context of unequal access to higher education, the grants offered in the fifties and sixties by Iraq, Syria and socialist countries, through the local sections of the Ba’ath and communist parties, made it possible to extend access to higher education to families with relatively modest income. Nevertheless, the fact that locally these political movements were mostly made up of individuals belonging to the three politically and economically prevailing Christian groups (particularly the Azayzat and the Karadsheh) meant that the members of those very groups were the ones to receive the grants.

The extent of social and cultural mobility achieved by the two groups is displayed in the fact that until now, the Karadsheh group alone has had 83 physicians, out of which 28 women, 22 pharmacists, out which 8 women, 51 architects, 65 engineers, 26 legal experts, 34 nurses, and around 90 Business Administration graduates.
3.5 THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL ORDER

3.5.1 FROM THE AGE OF PROPERTY OWNERS AND TRADERS...

Like in all cities, the development of urban activities created a social order, with its own social, economic and cultural hierarchy.

Until the late forties, the local economy, centred on agriculture and trade, represented the main source of income and wealth for the Madaba population. The social order that derived from the development of the local economy was characterised by the constitution of social groups, their differences, solidarity and hierarchy, according to the “ethnic” backgrounds, in other words real and fictitious family relations (lineage, confessional or community relations, like in the case of the community of Palestinian origin).

Therefore, in performing the in-depth social transformation that led them from a rural and pastoral lifestyle to an urban life, the three lineage groups that founded Madaba reorganised themselves on a new basis, thus reaching the top of the cultural, economic and social hierarchy of the new town that attracted ever more consistent migration flows. Of the three original groups, the Azayzat and the Karadsheh – from the start placed in a dominating position compared to the Ma’aya tribal group owing to hierarchy and tribal cohesion – were the ones to succeed in managing the social, economic, cultural and political situation to their advantage.

Thanks to their internal cohesion, their numbers and notoriousness, the alliances and association agreements with the surrounding tribes, the new networks based on marriage alliances, both groups were able to consistently extend their agricultural properties, to be involved in commercial activity to control a large part of the networks and commercial activities in the town.

The notables of the tribes became the large property owners and tradesmen of the town.

Due to the lack of public schools, access to education – especially secondary and university - was determined by economic capital. Economic predominance is what enabled both groups to gain a prevailing position in terms of education and culture.

3.5.2 … TO THE AGE OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND LIBERAL PROFESSIONS

In the second half of the twentieth century, the social and economic structure underscoring the distribution of wealth and power, the establishment of social statutes and the positions of individuals and groups underwent a deep transformation due to several inter-dependent factors:

- The decline of the agricultural sector versus the development of the services and commercial sectors. Agriculture and agricultural property were decreasingly a source of wealth, notoriousness and prestige.

- The new urban structure and economic configuration for the benefit of the capital, though to the detriment of the other towns, including Madaba. With the extraordinary expansion of Amman, especially after 1948, and the settlement of Palestinian refugees, the local economy underwent a considerable loss of relative autonomy, with Madaba soon becoming a satellite town. This however did involve a commercial activity slowdown. In fact, unlike most other urban centres, such as Salt and Karak, whose economic and commercial activities declined sharply because of the expansion of Amman, commercial activities were boosted by consistent demographic growth and the urbanisation of lifestyles in surrounding villages. Nevertheless, the setup of economic and commercial networks changed completely: wealth and access to prominent economic and social positions now depended on whether one had entered the economic circles of the capital, its business activities, commercial and services network.

- The emergence of a distributive and private income economy. The development of economic activities, either in the agricultural, industrial or tertiary sectors, was not the driving force of the powerful economic and urban growth in Jordan, in the second half of the twentieth century. Following the massive arrival of Palestinian refugees in 1948, and later in 1967, the Jordanian economy was spurred on the one hand by Arab and foreign aid,
and on the other by the transfer of emigrants. For instance, in the late seventies, the aid granted to Jordan by the oil-producing countries amounted to 1.25 billion dollars a year. Furthermore, still in the seventies, emigrants working in the neighbouring oil-producing countries represented 40% of the active Jordanian population, and the money they sent home amounted to 20% of the GDP (J. Abulughod, 1986). The economy was boosted by these funds that contributed towards developing the tertiary sector in particular. Hence the fundamental role of the State and its networks, first in the construction of infrastructures and the distribution of services and jobs (civil servants and military personnel have always accounted for around 50% of the resident active population), but also in access to social and economic positions and the setting-up of the social and economic hierarchies of individuals and groups.

- **Consolidation of the role of clientelism - according to relations, lineage and tribal solidarity, in the political, social and economic fields - and in access to resources.** Following independence, the State built its strength and legitimacy upon the Jordanian lineage and tribal structures. Access to political functions and the Civil Service was certainly linked to cultural background and personal qualification, but also to the “weight” and influence of the lineage and tribal groups. Instead, the influence and notoriousness of local notables and groups, as well as their access to economic resources, depended enormously on the positions and favours they were granted by the central authorities, and the relations they had established with the senior civil servants. In other words, social hierarchy, notoriousness and notability were just as frequently established at a local level as in relations with the central authorities and the political and public spheres of influence.

In Madaba, the social, economic and political transformation process began under British mandate, with the constitution of the army and Civil Service, though the effects were to be perceived only from the fifties onwards, following Jordanian independence. However, a significant date could be 1947, the year in which the region and Jordan itself were affected by a drought whose seriousness has marked the collective memory. This was the drought that the Madaba families referred to when mentioning the loss of value of their land that made landowners sell their lots to farmers and Muslim families who had recently settled in the town, so as to invest in other fields such as university for their children, and increasing emigration to the United-States, and later to oil-producing countries.

Slowly but steadily, the great landowners were no longer the protagonists and notables of the town. The new “generation” of notables was made up essentially of those who had reached the top ranks in the army and Civil Service. The members of this new generation had the following features: they were university graduates and had been educated in the English-speaking system (many senior Army officers and Civil Servants had attended the Anglican Secondary School in Amman); these individuals often belonged to the orthodox group of the Karadsheh, namely certain lineages of the group, as in the case, for instance, of part of the Hamarneh families, particularly the Jmay’an, three members of which were army generals (one of them was the aide-de-camp of King Hussein), while many others reached senior positions in the Civil Service. For several decades, the Jmay’an were the main local representatives of power and the privileged network for access to the Civil Service. They somehow represented a continuity of the lineage order and hierarchy: most of the Jmay’an who became famous thanks to the Army, and later to the Civil Service, were in fact descendants or direct relatives of the famous Ibrahim Jmay’an, Sheik of the Karadsheh tribe and mayor of Madaba from 1916 to 1919, and from 1923 to 1926.

The positions reached in the Army or Civil Service did not necessarily imply economic wealth. Nevertheless, notoriousness, the relations and networks established from such positions were a promising way of later embarking on a flourishing economic career in the private sector in Amman. This was a common characteristic of the stories of economic success told in Madaba, such as the first Jordanian civil engineer who became one of the richest businessmen in the building sector, after a career in the Civil Service where he was Under-Secretary of State for Civil Engineering. Another person made his fortune by supplying the Army with vehicles…

Notwithstanding some continuity, the new configuration of the social and economic order also went through interruptions and fractures: all the lineage groups had senior civil servants or
Army officers among their members. However, compared to the Karadsheh, most of the lineage segments of the catholic group of the Azayzat appeared as the poor relatives and losers, even though they once enjoyed great importance and "prestige". In fact, with the exception of a few lineage segments – such as the Masarweh – the Azayzat felt excluded from power, and only few of their members had access to top positions in the Army and Civil Service. Were the British mandatory authorities initially responsible for their exclusion, believing they were linked to the French like all Jordanian Catholics? Were they disadvantaged and excluded after independence due to the fact that many of them were members of the Jordanian communist party, which owed Madaba the nickname of "Madaba the Red" until the end of the seventies? Did the support of communism come from secondary schools they attended in Jerusalem in the thirties and forties? Or, on the contrary, can their allegiance to communism somehow be explained by their political exclusion by the British, and then later by the independent power? Whatever the answer may be, it is clear those political convictions, and the contestation of both the national political and local tribal orders, paradoxically took on a community-centred and lineage nuance in Madaba! Thus, even though the communist party did have members in most of the other lineage groups – especially among the Christians who had settled after the foundation of Madaba – the Azayzat were the ones to represent the main local base. Likewise, some segments of the Orthodox Hamarneh – related to the Karadsheh – made up the majority of the local Arab nationalist opposition group (mainly from the Ba’ath party). Excluded from power, these groups nevertheless had access to the business sector and the liberal professions in Madaba and in the capital; they were able to maintain their relatively privileged social and economic positions, thanks to their cultural background and former economic strength (landownership), supported by grants in former socialist countries and mobilising family and community solidarity networks (including the support of the Latin Church).

### 3.5.3 THE OTHER CHRISTIANS: « STRANGERS » OR « FOURTH BROTHER »?

For a long time, the three groups that originally founded Madaba defined the other Christians who arrived later as "Aghrab", in other words "strangers". This category applied to all of them, whether they came from Karak, Salt, Palestine, Lebanon or Armenia; the purpose was to stress that only the founding tribes could claim to fully embody the identity of Madaba, and that the "new-comers" had to remain on the outskirts of a social and political order based on lineage and anteriority. Yet these "strangers" were anything but new-comers: as we learned previously, they started arriving in Madaba before the end of the nineteenth century and almost all of them have been in Madaba for over half a century. In the thirties, they already represented about 25 % of the Christian population of the town, a proportion that does not appear to have changed today.

Defined and categorised by the others, this population never became a group in itself. Differences in geographical origin and confessional backgrounds (a majority Orthodox with a strong proportion of Latin Catholics, Melchite and Maronite), together with the divers origins and social situations, prevented this population from being constituted into an "ethnic" or community-centred group similar to the three other Christian groups. Thus, among the Christian families of Palestinian origin, a marked social gap still distinguishes the originally local families who were essentially tradesmen or craftsmen, from those families that came from villages in the rural context (commonly know as "Bajjalis") and who worked in agriculture. Unlike the original Christian tribes, the latter were not entitled to receive farmland and had access to ownership much later, after having bought the lands of the Christian or Muslim tribes that they had often farmed themselves.

Yet, generally speaking, the social and economic situation of most immigrant Christians, including the "Bajjali" has always been better than that of the Muslims who arrived in Madaba to work as fellahs. They became part of the social mobility process and had access to property ownership and schooling much sooner than the Muslims. There nevertheless still existed a wide gap with the other Christian groups, particularly the Karadsheh and the Azayzat. Until the early seventies, the proportion of those who had secondary school qualification was weak. Many attended the public primary school rather than the private confessional schools, unlike
almost all the Azayzat and Karadsheh and most of the Ma'aya (in 1995, the 37 Catholics and 180 Orthodox that attended the public boys’ school – out of 937 pupils – were mostly children from “immigrated Christian” groups).

This relatively disadvantaged situation of the “stranger” Christians was expressed in the unequal access to the system of distribution of employment with the Civil Service: weak educational background and tribal “weight” implied the weakness of the clientelist networks they could mobilise.

They were actually obliged to enter the clientelist networks of the dominant tribes, thus remaining in a secondary position on the edge of the social, economical and political space where the “original” Christians prevailed.

However, the categorisation of these “other” Christians as “strangers” did not imply social exclusion or a line of division. It was rather a symbolic downgrading to legitimise and perpetuate the dominant position of the three original groups at the top of the social and political hierarchy. So notwithstanding the legitimisation strategy, exchanges and amalgamations among the groups were frequent. The political groups, namely the communists and nationalists, were an important framework for exchanges and socialisation, thereby at least partially overcoming any division line established by the lineage order and its classifications. Furthermore, commercial and marriage relations often occurred between the “strangers” and the original tribes, though such relations were regularly set-up in compliance with the existing social classifications: the Karadsheh were connected to the Orthodox families of urban origin, the Azayzat to the Maronite and Armenian families from Lebanon. As for the Ma’aya, who were in a secondary position among the original tribes, they were related through marriage agreements with all the other Orthodox families among the “strangers”, including the “Bajjali” families of rural origin.

More recently, political and electoral interests spurred marriage ties to bring the “strangers” closer to the three original tribes. In fact, the Christians’ becoming a demographic minority, the issue of controlling the municipality, competition between the two dominating groups (the Azayzat and the Karadsheh) during the legislative elections to takeover the seat of deputy belonging to the Madaba Christians, compelled the two groups to re-define their identity-centred approach and to a certain extent to acknowledge the “other Christians”. In the past twenty years, the “fourth brother” belonging to one same Christian family replaced the “Aghrabs” category.

The residential inclusion of the « immigrated » Christian families was expressed spatially in the relations of distance and proximity with the three other Christian groups. These families moved to the outskirts of the residential areas of the three original tribes: many of the Orthodox families acceded to property in the North-East, near the residential territory of the Ma’aya. The Catholics mostly settled near the Azayzat. Like the three “original” Christian tribes, this spatial distribution of the families of the “fourth brother” remained stable until the beginning of the eighties.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE “FOURTH BROTHER” POPULATION
3.6 TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE

3.6.1 DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE: FROM A CHRISTIAN TO A MAINLY MUSLIM TOWN

The arrival and settlement of Muslims in Madaba date back to the late nineteenth century. The migratory flows that were hosted by the emerging village were partially made up of Muslims. Such was the case of the Syrian tradesmen, the Shamis, who, as indicated previously, chose to settle in the commercial streets of the Ottoman village, right above their shops. A few decades later, they bought land and built their houses in the north-eastern part of the historical centre, between the current Ring Road and the King Hussein Street. The situation was the same for most farmers, agricultural workers and shepherds who continued to arrive from Palestinian villages until the forties, to work on the farmland of the Christian and Muslim tribes. Muslim presence became noticeable in the public space as from the beginning of the twentieth century, namely through the construction in 1907 of a mosque and a Koranic school in the middle of the historical centre. In 1921, after the instauration of the British mandate, the number of Muslims out of a population of 2000 was 300, that is 15% of the population. Until the early thirties, the town was made up of a large majority of Christians and many of the migrants who had settled in Madaba were Christians.

As from the forties, the confessional composition changed due to several factors:

- **The settlement of the surrounding Muslim tribes and their moving closer to the town.** Progressively a part of these tribes settle in Madaba or in the zones situated close to the historical center.

- **The settling down of farmers, tenant farmers and farm workers who worked on the agricultural properties of the Muslim tribes in the surroundings of Madaba.**

- **The arrival of just over 2000 mainly Muslim Palestinian refugees in 1949/1950,** essentially Muslims, who settled in a camp to the South-West of the town.

- **The marked drop in birth rates of Christians,** as a consequence of urbanisation and lifestyles, and the beginning of a new emigration flow of Christians from Madaba to the Capital and abroad.

- **The growing rural exodus from the Muslim villages of the region,** increasingly urban lifestyles, the decline and crisis of agriculture in the villages, the search for employment in Madaba, but more particularly in Amman where economic activities were concentrated, the accessibility and proximity of Amman and the facility of taking transport from Madaba where housing was more accessible were all factors that contributed to the speeding up of the momentum of rural exodus, as from the mid-sixties.

This explains the marked demographic growth and urban expansion that the town witnessed. From 2000 people in 1921, to 11224, the population of Madaba increased to a population of 28200 in 1975, with a yearly average population increase of 5.26% between 1961 and 1979 that exceeded almost all the Jordanian towns — overtaken only by Aqaba, and slightly more by Irbid, and by Amman, of course. Later, the growth rate was to decrease almost imperceptibly and the population continued to have a yearly increase of 4.6% until 1994, when it reached 55700 inhabitants. The drop in the growth rate in the last ten years (2.3%) did not mean that the rural exodus to the suburbs had slowed down. Some of the areas that are now part of the territory of the Great Madaba Municipality have witnessed an over 5% population growth rate. Thus, though the town of Madaba in 2004 had a population of 70000, the municipality instead had a population of 100 000 inhabitants.
All these factors caused a transformation in the confessional and religious conformation of the population and in the number of different family groups. From the early sixties, the Christian population that had represented almost the entire population of the village at its foundation became a minority.

Thus the percentage of the Christian population out of the total town population went from 85% in 1921, to 57% in 1955, to less than 40% in 1969. The trend grew in the past thirty years together with the rural exodus: Christian communities nowadays represent at the most 12 to 15% of the town population.

Despite its importance, the change in the confessional setup does not in itself explain the changes in the relations among the different community groups, nor the evolution of the urban structure or the crisis that started affecting the town from the late seventies in terms of its public spaces, its central areas and its residential social structure. Though demographic changes must be taken into account, the key to understanding the current crisis of the town lies in the upsetting of the social, urban, economic and political order.

The Latin Church estimated the number of Christians in 1969 around 5000 people out of a town population of 12500 (Chatelard, 2000). The estimate of the number of Christians is probably realistic. However, the total population was certainly underestimated, for it already amounted to 11224 in 1961. In other words, considering the yearly average demographic growth rate, the estimate should be of a town population of 16900 in 1969, with the Christian population at the time representing around 30% of the population.
3.6.2 THE MADABA MUSLIMS: HETEROGENEOUS SOCIAL ITINERARIES

The Muslim population of the town is far from being a homogeneous group. Consistent economic and social gaps have caused stratification among heterogeneous and different groups.

THE TRIBES AND THEIR DIFFERENT POSITIONS WITHIN THE URBANISATION PROCESS.

Gaps already existed among the different tribal groups around Madaba at the time of its foundation. Their settlement, with the transition from a pastoral life-style followed by an urbanisation process, occurred at different stages depending on the various groups and even lineage sub-groups.

- Such was the case for part of the Bani Sakhr tribes whose land covered a wide area of the Balqa’a region, including the zones situated in the North and East of Madaba (and Madaba itself before it was attributed by the Ottomans to the Christian tribes), and that had already performed the transition to agriculture in the mid-nineteenth century, even before the birth of Madaba. Among these families, the El Fayez in particular were thus able to control the most fertile land in the region, becoming the owners of large domains they farmed by hiring Palestinian peasants. Thanks to their farm products, they were also able to enter the trade exchange and urban economy circles boosted by the development of Madaba. This in turn gave them quite early access to education; more recently, the value of their property skyrocketed thanks to their position to the North of Madaba, along the road to Amman. All these success factors reinforced both the cohesion and esprit-de-corps (Assabyah) of the Fayez, and to a wider extent, of the Bani Sakhr, as well as their economic wealth and political power. Visible evidence of this political and economic fortune is offered by the large villas to the north of Madaba and along the road to Amman, the high number of those who reached senior positions in the Military, the Civil Service and politics (with two prime ministers). Of course, most tribal branches of the Bani Sakhr did not enjoy a destiny and success comparable to the Fayez, but their belonging to the same group placed them to different extents on a socially upward trend. Today, a small part of the Bani Sakhr lives in the municipality of Madaba (especially in the new relatively wealthy residential neighbourhoods).

- The destiny of the Bani Sakhr is very useful to interpret the situation of another group that is at the other extremity of the social and political hierarchy among the Muslim tribal groups of Madaba, namely the Bani Hamida tribal group. The traditional partners of the Azayzat, the Bani Hamida had quite a vast tribal territory extending to the south and south west of Madaba. However, unlike the other tribal groups, particularly the Bani Sakhr, they were disadvantaged by a series of interdependent factors: they were late in starting the settlement process and in transiting from a pastoral to an agricultural life; their land was not very fertile; the value of their properties was low due their position south of Madaba (at the opposite side of the land in the North, along the road to Amman). The situation led to late mobility towards Madaba, with the consequent delayed and limited access to education. In fact, the Bani Sakr only started settling in Madaba in the sixties and their arrival resembled rural exodus from their poor and crisis-stricken farm villages. They settled in the suburbs, in the Quartier Est (east of the current Ring Road), in other words in what was to become the underprivileged residential area of town (with the exception of the Palestinian camp). The economically most disadvantaged tribal group, the Bani Sakr, also had the least political power and a feeble capacity of attracting the clientelist networks that would have ensured access to resources and jobs “distribution”. Their access to public employment is normally through posts at the lowest administrative scale particularly as soldiers without a grade in the army. This situation means also that they remain at the periphery of the municipal political space.

- The tribal group of the Balkawieh (the Azaydeh, Chawabkeh and Abou el Ganam) did not enjoy the same upward social, economical and political trend as the Bani Sakhr, more particularly the Fayez, but they were certainly in a more favoured situation than the Hamaymdeh. The settlement process of the Balkawiah, whose territory was to the north west of Madaba, occurred as Madaba developed. The protection that this tribal group had
granted the Christian tribes ever since they arrived in Madaba, their alliance and support later facing the Bani Sakhr, the agricultural partnership established with the Christian group of the Karadcheh, are only some of the factors that contributed towards approaching Balkawieh to the town and introducing them into its economic trends and social and political space. The Balkawieh were therefore only one step behind the Christians in following the same process, i.e. transition to agriculture, urbanisation and access to the public circles through the political and civil service ramifications. They often had one of their members representing Madaba in parliament, and several government ministers. As from the early fifties, their residential area started shifting towards the historical centre of Madaba. Thus a neighbourhood made up essentially of the members of this tribe (including its elders and its Sheik) was created and started extending north west, near the historical village. The neighbourhood grew in the following decades, soon becoming the main centre of the tribal group, though its agricultural and residential area was much vaster and included several villages to the west and north of Madaba.

THE « TRIBE-LESS »: MOSTLY DISADVANTAGED POPULATIONS

In addition to those for whom belonging to a tribal group represented a basis – not to say the very foundation of their social identity, a way of being part of a social group and socialization area, a support for the establishment of social and residential itineraries, a means for entering the local and national political field -, in addition to the “tribes people”, there were the “others” categorizing those who were, or were slowly becoming, more or less “tribeless” (at least in the local and political context), deprived of any support usually offered by tribes at the social, economic, identity and symbolic levels.

• These “tribeless” people were first « immigrants » who came and settled in Madaba individually, or more frequently small rootless families, separated from their original social groups. Rural exodus had caused these were families to move to town inordinately, creating a certain distance from their families and causing them to suddenly find themselves without their extended family networks. These were often Palestinian refugees whose situation in Madaba was of poverty and exclusion. However, the tribeless were also those people whose tribes had been upset by the differentiation and social levelling action of the town that also fragmented their relational fabric. In Jordan like elsewhere, the “urban tribes” were less a heritage than a reconstruction or achievement: the “esprit-de-corps” and solidarity could only be preserved and reproduced at the cost of a collective maintenance effort and by supplying members with certain material and symbolic benefits. The « tribeless » in Madaba were relatively marginalized from the socially prevailing groups who structured the social and residential space, controlled their space and economic networks and dominated thanks to their networks that influenced the space and political frameworks. The tribeless people did their best to rebuild family or surrogate networks and solidarities, nevertheless they remained in peripheral positions in the social, economic, urban and/or political fields of town.

• The tribeless were peasants, farm tenants and farm workers who arrived from the Palestinian villages prior to the forties to work on the farms of the Christian and Muslim tribes. For many years, most of these families lived in makeshift accommodation built on the properties where they worked. It was only from the late forties that they reached a certain social and residential mobility – often after having purchased small farming properties. They first settled in houses to the north east of the historical centre, especially in the “Quartier Est”, where they purchased building land or rented accommodation. The residential area of these families was structured progressively according to their family relations and/or geographical background. For instance, this area of town soon had different neighbourhoods: the Hachaycheh neighbourhood, the Rawajih – in reference to the family groups who were able to reconstitute themselves – the Hawarneh (for those from Hawran), the Masarweh (from Egypt), though this population is generally still today the least advantaged in town. During the past few decades, a part of this population started a process of residential mobility, especially in the direction of the new residential neighbourhoods located in the North of the city (East Hanina).
• **The Palestinian refugees.** The situation of the camp and of its population was particular in several respects. Unlike most Palestinian camps in Jordan, Madaba had a double drawback: its population was made up either of Bedouins from the Néguev or peasants. It therefore had a very low cultural capital and the refugees had had no urban experience upon arriving in Madaba. Furthermore, the camp did not obtain refugee status from UNRWA and only marginally benefited from the assistance of the organisation. Even the school that was created by UNRWA at quite a late stage, in 1958, was closed in 1964. Initially, the support of the local population, associations and churches made it possible to deal with the emergency situation. In the average and long term though, no solution was found to the issue of looking after the population and building the infrastructures, social, educational and sanitary services. Since it had not received the status of refugee camp, the public authorities should have taken over, but this was more than the municipality could afford. Furthermore, the prevalence of tribal clientelism in municipal affairs led to the town authorities’ “naturally” abandoning the camp and its population, which cannot be explained by the predominance of “Christians” in local affairs. In fact, the Muslim tribes that were starting to gain importance in local and municipal politics were not very supportive of the camp population in social and political terms. Evidence of this lies in the development of social, cultural and political trends that transcend boundaries and community-centred and tribal rationales. In fact for many years, generally Christian groups and networks supported the disadvantaged population of the camp, two of which were particularly active:

• **First the YWCA women’s Christian association** that had a branch in Madaba founded in 1956 by 19 women with the support of the American protestant networks, and later, of the Orthodox church. It is interesting to notice that all these women, some of which were university graduates, were orthodox or protestant, and came from Salt and Palestine. They had moved to Madaba after having married men belonging to the Karadsheh, and, in some cases, to the Azayzat. Since they had decided to develop social and cultural actions in favour of poor families, whatever their community or confessional background, they became committed to the disadvantaged Muslim neighbourhood in the eastern part of town, and particularly in the Palestinian camp. Some of the actions launched in the camp included household training and the opening of a needlework centre, in 1965, to train women and enable them to earn an income, a kindergarten, and training for young girls to become kindergarten teachers…

• **The same was true for the left-wing political networks,** the communists and the Ba’thists (mostly Christians belonging to the Azayzat and the Hamarneh) who launched several social and cultural initiatives such as literacy courses for adults held by teachers, and free medical centres. Furthermore, these political wings lobbied the municipality to ensure it would meet the needs of the camp population in terms of services and infrastructures. From 1967 to 1971, these political groups, including most of the Azayzat and the Hamarneh - were actively engaged in supporting Palestinian organisations. During the military conflict between these organisations and the Jordanian army, many militants took the sides of the Palestinian militants… Beyond the political positioning and the dramatic nature of the episode, it is important to stress the strong ties and relations established by a large part of the Christian community with the Palestinians, beyond any tribal and confessional boundary.

The social and political commitment of the Christian networks probably explains the fact that the Islamic associations and networks only appeared much later on the social and political field in Madaba, compared to other Palestinian camps, in other words during the seventies.

• **Families from the Rural Exodus.** As stated previously, from the sixties, the town faced a massive and growing inflow of families from the villages in the region. These families were certainly not all disadvantaged. Some of them, thanks to agricultural property or an early insertion into the commercial activities or emigration networks, had achieved a good social and economic level thanks to which they were able to settle immediately in the new middle and upper class neighbourhoods that had started developing as from the late sixties in the northern part of Madaba. However, most of the families from the rural exodus had very modest economic resources or were even poor upon their arrival in Madaba. Their settle-
ment in town often meant trying to be inserted in the urban life and the economic activities, in Madaba or Amman. However, the economic context of the past fifteen years and the growing difficulties in finding accommodation weighed heavily upon the social and residential insertion conditions of these families, many of which remained in a situation of poverty.

3.6.3 SOCIAL MOBILITY

In the past forty years, the Muslim population in Madaba entered a process of social mobility and urbanisation that affected the different groups unequally, but which generally speaking significantly reduced the important gap separating them from the Christian population.

Several factors contributed to the process:

- **Widespread access to primary and secondary education and greater accessibility to universities.** One datum can help us understand the extent of the delay that still existed in the fifties in terms of education: although the Muslims already represented 43% of the population, only 17% attended the Madaba schools. The delay was even more important than it appears, for the figures do not include the population attending secondary schools outside Madaba, which included very few Muslim students. In other words, in 1955, a maximum of 40% of the Muslim children went to school, while the Christian children generally started attending school well before the end of the nineteenth century. In any case, as from the early sixties, Muslims started appearing among the highly qualified executives and professionals (physicians, engineers, etc.). From then onwards, the rate of school attendance started a fast upward trend, with good educational levels, even in the disadvantaged areas. It is interesting to stress the important contribution of the UNRWA school towards boosting primary school attendance in the Palestinian camp, even though the school was closed in 1964, only six years after its creation.

- **Growing access to employment in the Civil Service and the Army.** This was particularly true in the seventies, given the important number of jobs offered at the time in the Civil Service. Nevertheless, access to public employment was both a factor of mobility and a widening of the social and economic gaps among the different groups of the Muslim population. The job distribution largely benefited the tribal groups, particularly those who were able to establish effective political and clientelist networks, to the detriment of the “tribeless” and the tribes of Palestinian origin. This differentiated accessibility was even more marked later, especially as from the early eighties, due to the drop in public employment, the expulsion or return of several hundred thousand Jordanians of Palestinian origin from Kuwait and the Arab oil-producing countries, after the 1991 Gulf war, the increasingly difficult access to the emigration networks, the economic crisis and the rise in unemployment.

- **Access to the emigration networks.** Emigration towards the Arab oil-producing countries was certainly an important social mobility factor for a large part of the Muslim population in Madaba. It was even the most determining factor for the populations who did not belong to a tribe and those of Palestinian origin. The savings achieved by the emigrants and the money transfers they made to their families represented resources that enabled the populations concerned to access new economic activities (investment in trade, creation of small companies, real-estate investments, etc.), achieve residential mobility and improve their living conditions, invest in the schooling and education of their children.

3.6.4 TIME OF CRISES : STALLED MOBILITY

Since about fifteen years, Madaba has been facing a new social and economic situation characterised by (i) the persistence of the rural exodus that brought new families to the towns who tried to enter the urban economic activities, (ii) the rarefaction of income and employment sources, both in the private and public sectors, (iii) the closing of the migration areas that for many decades had absorbed a large part of the labour force and generated important transfers for families.

This situation meets all the requirements of an acute social crisis, the most visible part of which
is unemployment. In fact, this crisis is ever more acute and dangerous that it especially affects the young people, a large part of whom have achieved cultural mobility thanks to a growing educational capital, and who have a deep feeling of injustice and exclusion versus the clientelist approach of public and private institutions. The crisis therefore derives from a social fragmentation process, fed by a residential and urban fabric crisis and by the destabilization of the social order ruling exchanges and cooperation among groups and communities.

3.7 A NEW URBAN STRUCTURE ?

3.7.1 URBAN GROWTH AND EXPANSION

The four figures below depict the expansion of the town in 1918, 1968, 1994 and 2002. It appears clearly that the town developed quite concentrically until 1968 around its historical centre that was clearly still was its framework. Instead, from 1968 onwards, the town extended over a vast area, a small fragment of which was the historical centre. Furthermore, development was not homogeneous, but especially extended north.

So how was the new urban territory structured? How were the different groups distributed and according to what social hierarchy? How were commercial activities set-up? And what happened with the historical centre in this new organization of space and what was its position within the new urban structure?
PLAN 2 : MADABA IN 1968 (MASTER PLAN)
3.7.2 FROM A MOSAIC TO A PIECEMEAL TOWN

Until the early seventies, despite the lack of an urban scheme, the town had managed to absorb demographic development without its urban and residential structure collapsing or disintegrating. The newcomers were integrated in a residential area or participated in its extension by setting up groups according to family or background relations. This is not to say that the residential area was not socially organised into a hierarchy or differentiated, or that the town had no poor neighbourhoods. However, even in the disadvantaged areas – such as the “Quartier Est” that developed from the fifties – were “living centres” or “community neighbourhoods” characterised both by the density of their relational fabric and a certain, more or less shared, social and spatial order...

As from the seventies, the town had to face much greater challenges – particularly the urban and residential structures –, trying to meet both (i) needs deriving from the massive arrival of rural populations with generally modest economic resources, or even poor, (ii) the new requirements engendered by the mobility and social ascension process of a consistent part of the population, (iii) the degradation of the residential fabric of the historical centre, (iv) the need for developing a commercial structure in relation to the demographic and urban development and the town’s function as a regional centre. Another challenge arose in the early eighties: to meet the requirements of the immigrant families who were obliged to return at the end of the Gulf war. These challenges could have been an extraordinary development opportunity.

The total absence of any form of action by the public authorities and the municipality in terms of planning and managing urban development and enforcing town planning schemes, has led to a crisis in the urban structure and residential fabric of both the historical centre and the rest of town. This crisis was also to have very negative social effects on inter-community relations and “co-existence”. The residential structure crisis was to accentuate another crisis of the urban centre and public spaces.

THE DISADVANTAGED AREAS: DEGRADATION OF HOUSES AND RESIDENTIAL CAPTIVITY

Prior to the seventies, a slowdown in the rural exodus made it easier for the families leaving their villages to find accommodation in Madaba. Later, the massive arrival of rural families added to the different previously mentioned factors that severely affected the housing market, especially rented accommodation, making the residential insertion of disadvantaged families more and more difficult and uncertain. In the past fifteen years, this situation was accompanied by growing difficulties in achieving economic insertion and access to employment, thus worsening the capacity of the disadvantaged families that had just arrived from their villages, of finding decent accommodation that would meet their social requirements. This has led to growing uncertainty in accommodation and the constitution of increasingly poor and underprivileged areas.

However, living conditions did not only concern accommodation. The social and residential insertion also depended on town planning, the construction of infrastructures and the creation of public services, the development of activities and social, educational and cultural equipment (to meet the needs of children and young people in particular), etc… In truth, very little was done to support and favour the residential and social insertion of newcomers. The municipality did not even play the fundamental role of enforcing the rules and regulations of urbanism and construction, with the result that a growing number of residential areas and neighbourhoods developed anarchically. Rising residential density was accompanied by defective infrastructures and poverty for families.

This was particularly the case of the « East Neighbourhood » that in the past thirty years was one of the main areas where families from the rural exodus settled. The Egyptian immigrant workers who today are the majority among the farm labourers in Madaba also lived in the neighbourhood.

With the exception of the Palestinian camp, the population considered this poor neighbourhood as the lowest on the social scale. “Pavements have not even been invented there” is what
some of the Madaba inhabitants say when referring to the urban anarchy and the lack of infrastructures and public services in this underprivileged area. One of the multiple effects of growing precariousness in the living conditions of this area was the social tension among the families and the different groups: the first inhabitants who settled in the fifties and sixties blamed the newcomers for the degradation of their surroundings and living conditions, thus upsetting social classes and impoverishing the social and residential fabric. Those who could afford it fled to other neighbourhoods, while those who could not leave lived in what they described as being a situation of forced cohabitation and residential captivity. Urban anarchy contributed towards the decomposition of the social and residential fabric of these areas, thus increasing the poverty of families.

The jeopardizing of living conditions and social destabilisation did not only concern this neighbourhood or other areas characterised by the poverty and vulnerability of their inhabitants. In fact, the combination of the pressure of demographic development – with consequent growing housing need – and of the lack of any town planning or control of urban growth amplified urban anarchy and its effects to all the residential and social fabric of the town, including the neighbourhoods of the relatively privileged populations and those based on tribal or lineage solidarity. A considerable number of those neighbourhoods also underwent social segregation with the flight of relatively wealthy families towards areas less concerned by the expansion of anarchic urbanisation.

THE NEW RICH AREA

As from the late eighties, a new residential area started developing to the north west of Madaba, on the Hanina heights. At the time, the cost of land was nowhere near the highest in Madaba. In less than 15 years, the area was already covered in wealthy-looking villas. The cost by square meter reached unprecedented figures in the region. It is indisputably the most chic neighbourhood in Madaba and living there is nowadays one of the ultimate signs of social distinction. To make this clear for everyone, it was nicknamed “Chmaysani Madaba” which is the most chic neighbourhood in Amman. Not only is it at the top of the social hierarchy of the residential areas, it is the reference in the scale of values. It has acquired social value, together with some of the surrounding areas (East Haninah and a part of the Azaydeh area), while the East Neighbourhood and the Palestinian Camp in the south are at the bottom of the social scale.

Unlike the town’s “traditional” residential areas, this neighbourhood is not a community and its population is characterised by its “mixed-nature”: one part is Christian, but the majority is Muslim. Here a big majority of Palestinians who became wealthy in the Gulf countries before returning back in 1991 live with other immigrants who came back to the country with their fortunes, they also live with tribe notables, senior civil servants, professionals, rich landlords and trade men, or even well-t-do families from the middle class who paid the necessary price to flee from other neighbourhood in order to live in this “respectable” neighbourhood. In any case, the neighbourhood is the witness of a double process: the social ascension of the Muslims and of the constitution among them of quite a rich class, and the social segregation and the creation of new residential areas on the basis of socio-economic status. Another indication of the social value of the neighbourhood is the creation of the two most popular private Muslim schools in town. These are the only collective structures in this exclusively residential area.
In spite of such a social situation, this neighborhood shows that the new neighborhoods are only residential spaces which are not endowed with public spaces or spaces for entertainment and socialization. This explains the difficult situation of the youth in such neighborhoods, which also witnesses to the difficulties encountered currently by all the youth in Madaba, particularly young girls. Since they have no leisure area or meeting and socialisation opportunities outside the family and school, leisure time becomes a burden for the young: boys are bored and the girls are kept at home. This is especially the case among the young Muslims. Instead the young Christians have access to sports, social, cultural and leisure activities organised by the church network. “Madaba is an anti-youth town” said a young student. “No, it is first and foremost an anti-girl town” answered a friend of his. “No”, said another young girl, “First of all it is not a town, it has nothing of a town. It is not even a village, especially in my neighborhood: only those who do not live here like it!”

### 3.7.3 CRISIS AND DEGRADATION OF THE HISTORICAL CENTRE

#### DEGRADATION OF THE RESIDENTIAL FABRIC

For an entire century, the historical town centre of Madaba constituted for its inhabitants a medium for living and a community-neighborhood with a dense relational fabric and collective memory. Until the end of the seventies, the space and the collective memory were transmitted
from one generation to another.

The cycle collapsed and this place of collective memory began a process of degradation of the residential and commercial fabric. The community for which this neighbourhood was the cornerstone of identity, family and collective memory, blamed the “others”, the “newcomers”, for having invaded them and encircled them in.

In fact an endogenous process first broke the cycle before the “others” “weighed” upon the residential and urban structure of the town.

The historical centre of Madaba was no exception: all neighbourhoods have a life cycle: they are born, develop, age, are degraded and collapse, unless a collective renovation action is launched. This life cycle concerns both the physical (including built-up areas and infrastructures) and social spaces, and lifestyles. Thus as from the early seventies (perhaps even before), several factors started to be associated:

- The physical degradation of the built-up area, as shown by the houses in ruin;
- The ageing and degradation of infrastructures (pavements, roads, etc.)
- The evolution in the lifestyles and expectations of the inhabitants, and, particularly of the new generations in terms of living conditions, surfaces, equipment, comfort, etc. The evolution pertained both to the general cultural context and social and economic mobility that the population concerned started achieving as from the early fifties.

A new cycle arose in this context, associating (i) the residential mobility of young people, (ii) population ageing and (iii) the population turnover.

- **Socio-residential Mobility of Young People.** After getting married, the young couples from the neighborhoods moved to the residential neighborhoods and areas according to social level. Leaving aside those who moved to Amman, generally speaking, mobility went through three more or less overlapping stages: (i) young couples first moved to new houses situated immediately next to their neighborhood, or in its immediate suburb. In this stage, as mentioned previously, each of the community-centered neighborhoods had expanded, keeping their unity. The extension process was of course ancient. However, the new element was the ageing and non-renewal of the population in the old houses situated in the middle of the various residential territories. In other words, these areas progressively started losing their population from the middle. (ii) During the second stage, the residential mobility involved houses situated near the centre, though not necessarily attached to the community-based area. This was namely the case of the neighborhood situated to the west of the “King Abdallah Street” that was largely inhabited by Christians. (iii) The third stage, starting from the mid eighties, corresponded to the development of a spatial segregation trend whereby the Christian community, or part of it, was trying to reconstruct an exclusive and protected area far from the Muslims. The new residential area of Taym was built on the road of Ma'in, eleven kilometres to the South West of Madaba on land that used to belong to the Azayzats. However, the families that moved to this area were from all the lineage groups. The development of the area clearly displayed the degradation of inter-community relations and the “cohabitation” crisis. Another indication of the fact is the establishment in this new residential area of a Christian cemetery, a new Latin kindergarten, a sports club and a swimming pool open to Christian members only. Together with the development of this new area, some of the families moved to Hanin-West, the new chic multi-confessional neighborhood of Madaba.

- **Ageing and Succession of Population.** As they left the historical centre, the young couples left their ageing parents in the neighbourhood. At their death, the houses were practically never sold, but rented to newcomers. This is why the historical centre currently has a considerable number of families belonging to the Bani Hamid, families from surrounding villages who moved to Madaba incited by rural exodus, but also immigrant Egyptian workers. The departure trend was enhanced by the situation of ageing/decomposing social fabric, together with the arrival of poor populations of different origin, which was felt by the elderly people and the young couples left behind as a situation of social degradation. Those who could not afford to move lived in a situation of residential captivity, an additional
factor of inter-community tensions. The deepening of the inter-community crises was displayed by another fact: in the past ten years, most families refused to rent their empty houses to Muslims, preferring to leave them empty unless they were able to find Christian tenants.

COLLAPSE OF THE COMMERCIAL CENTRALITY

From the creation of the commercial centre of the Ottoman village until the mid seventies, the structure of the commercial area of the town was stable. The King Talal Street and El Hachemi Street were the two shopping centres (particularly the former).

This structure changed deeply in the past thirty years, particularly as from the early eighties, because of several factors:

- **An important development of the commercial structure led to a sharp rise in the number and diversity of shops.** The development of commercial activities was first connected to the fast demographic and urban development of the town in the past thirty years. It was also a consequence of the consolidation of the function of Madaba as a commercial centre at a regional scale. The commercial fabric developed and diversified to meet the growing requirements of the surrounding villages. The growing urbanisation of the life and consumption styles of the populations of these villages, added to the multiplication of means of transport, all contributed to the reinforcement of the town’s function as a regional centre.

- **The historical centre was losing its function as a commercial centre and shops were moved towards new linear areas.** The King Talal Street is now in a very marginal position within the commercial structure of the town. The situation of the shops degraded sharply in the late seventies, early eighties. The shops remaining from the old commercial structure find it difficult to survive, as shown by the degraded and messy façades. In the past 15 years, new shops for tourists were opened in this street and in some of its side streets. However, the new commercial function based on tourism is having difficulties in imposing itself. Such difficulties certainly depend on the relative degradedness of the historical centre, though also and especially to the fraudulent practices of tourist guides who dissuade tourists from entering these shops, guiding them - for a fee - to shops outside the town.

- **As you may see in the following plan, the commercial functions of the town are now concentrated along three poles: the King Abdallah Street, the Petra Street and its extension towards Amman, and, to a lesser extent, the El Hachemi Street.** Furthermore, all have different specialisations: the “King Abdallah Street” is where most of the clothes shops in town are concentrated; the “Petra Street” mostly has food shops and the “El Hachemi Street” jeweller shops.
The King Abdallah Street (or the « Lovers’ Street»). In the first decades of the twentieth century, this is the street where the Friday cattle market was organised. It lost its function towards the mid twentieth century. Furthermore, there were no constructions on the western side of the street. With the exception of a few shops dating back to the fifties, its only function until the late sixties was to be a place where young people from the historical centre could stroll. “It was just earth and ruins” recalled a shop-owner. Towards the late seventies, shops started to be established in this street, along the eastern side first. The western side was only built-up and occupied by commercial activities ten years later. The development was first linked to the extension of urbanisation to the east and north east of the town (especially with the emergence and development of the Azaydeh neighbourhood to the north east of the historical centre). It was favoured by its position between the historical centre and the new neighbourhoods. The new deployment also went hand in hand with the modernisation of the shops in terms of their outlay, the kind of wares, etc., while the shops in the historical centre remained traditional. A new generation of mostly Christian shopkeepers was also born (as those in the historical centre), younger and more open to the evolution of lifestyles and fashion.2

2 It is interesting to note that the shops’ degradation in the historical centre was not connected to the arrival of the Muslims and their investments in commercial activities, as reported in some stories. Yet, another example of the tension between memory and history …
• **Petra Street and its North extension.** Shops were opened along the « Petra Street » especially in the past ten years, in connexion with the extension of the town northwards (the Hanina neighbourhoods) and to the east of the historical centre. It was also favoured by the fact that the « Petra Street » is on the main communication axis between Amman and the South, and by the railway station that was moved in the early eighties, from the north east of the historical centre to its current position. It is interesting to notice that shops were not opened along the whole length of « Petra Street » but especially starting from the railway station. The extension went well beyond the « Petra Street » northwards, in other words towards the new densely inhabited areas. The shops were differentiated: the shops near the railway station were mainly for the villagers who arrived with public transport. Instead, the shops to the north were especially for the town inhabitants, especially those living in the northern part. Generally speaking, the inhabitants from the villages south of Madaba were an important part of the customers (probably over 50%). Lastly, the shopkeepers were mostly of Palestinian origin, and many of them were emigrants from the oil-producing countries. They invested in commercial activities after having been obliged to the country, in 1991.

• **The shops in El-Hachemi Street.** The traditional shopping street of Madaba, were transformed in the eighties to meet the requirements of the populations from the surrounding villages; several jeweller shops have been opened in the past ten years. On one end of the road is the railway-station, which makes it the natural access to Madaba for villagers arriving by public transport. In any case, the customers are largely made up of villagers.

Finally, Madaba has clearly developed its structure and commercial activity in the past thirty years, consolidating its position as the commercial centre of the region. However, in the absence of any town planning, development was linear, following three communication axes. This led to a broken commercial structure without any territorial unity, which weighed heavily upon the centre and its function as an urban centre that could not be limited to the commercial dimension only. So instead of being a lever for boosting its function, namely containing public spaces, its development interrupted the function of the town as a centre. This is one of the paradoxes of the anarchic urban development that occurred in Madaba in the past decades: the town developed its commercial activities and its function as a regional centre, while destroying its own central areas.
3.8 THE LOCAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CONTROL OF THE MUNICIPALITY

3.8.1 THE AGE OF CONSENSUS

It is with a combination of nostalgia, admiration and regret that the collective memory retraces its memory of the municipal institution and its function in the course of the first decades of the beginning of the century. As it is depicted, the municipality of Madaba, one of the first in Jordan, was first an institution founded on the consensus of the different groups that made up the town: the three lineage groups (through their elders) were represented and agreed on appointing the mayor. The succession at the head of the municipality occurred by rotation among the elders of the three groups. The second feature of this ancient municipality was the concern for collective interest and the effort to improve and develop the town or, quoting some municipal documents of the time, to try and make Madaba a town based on progress and civilisation. Evidence of the concern for collective interest was offered by the unremitting effort that mobilised all the resources of the community to convey water to Madaba from a spring situated more than 10km away from the town (in 1929); the paving and lighting of the shopping streets of the new town...

In more than one respect, this reconstituted memory – by contrast and by opposition – is evidence of the subsequent period, but especially of the present.

3.8.2 THE AGE OF CLIENTELISM

From the fifties until the beginning of the eighties, several aspects, namely conflicts for taking over municipal power, marked local political life:

- The lineage groups of the Karadcheh and some minority lineages of the Azayzat that had established privileged relationships with the authorities were able to control the municipality throughout the period. The Azayzat, and many of the Hamarneh, the framework of the communist and Ba’athist opposition, were for a long time excluded from municipal power.

- The municipality functioned on the one hand as an instrument through which the central authority controlled local political life and established its local networks, and on the other, as a means thanks to which the local elders consolidated their local power as well as their networks and positions within the political and administrative circles of Amman. Following the clientelist rational, the municipality progressively became an object of appropriation and a means for obtaining and distributing advantages and jobs in favour of some individuals and groups, to the detriment of others. The construction of the current municipal building is one of many significant examples: the owner of the building firm was a close relative of the mayor, while the locally hired builders belonged to a Muslim tribal group that was allied to the Mayor’s tribe and that cast their votes for him in the municipal elections.

- Municipal power favoured social fragmentation and exclusion. Ever since the municipality had become an object of appropriation, conflict and competition to achieve individual interests to the detriment of collective interest became predominant in relations among the different groups. Furthermore, the clientelist rationale underlying the exercise of power and municipal action tended to favour the dominant groups – their members and territories – to the detriment of the “tribeless”. This was for instance the case of the Palestinian camp and of its inhabitants, but also of the poor areas of the town.

- The electoral law in force until the mid-fifties contributed towards fostering this kind of approach, while at the same time enhancing inter-community tensions. In fact, according to the law, only men who paid the property tax were entitled to vote at the municipal elections, which de facto excluded tenants, i.e. the majority of the Muslim population in town. In the 1951 elections, the Muslims represented 31% of the population, though only 7% were electors. The amendment of this law in 1955 extended the right to vote, though without generalising it: only men who paid the municipality a tax of 1 Dinar were entitled to vote. Muslims then represented 43% of the population, though only 30% of the electors.

In 1981, a Muslim was elected mayor and presided over the town council for the first time in the history of Madaba. The Christian groups felt they had been placed in minority and dispossessed of “their” town.

The novelty of this event was not merely the passage of municipal power from one community to another. The Christian hegemony loss over the municipality was accompanied by the loss of social and political hegemony in the Muslim tribes. In fact, the elections were not won by those tribes but by the candidates of the Islamic Action Front that particularly benefited from the vote and support of the camp population. So those who had been excluded by the former electoral law, who were in the margin of the clientelist networks, drew no benefit.

Paradoxically, the change also offered evidence of the importance of the social and economic mobility that was accomplished by the Muslim populations in town. The Islamic networks in Madaba did not only count upon the support of disadvantaged populations, but also and especially on those who despite having achieved a good educational level and/or economic position were excluded or at the margin of powerful lineage and political groups. Interestingly, the stigmatisation and condemnation of tribalism and of its “assabyah” was one of the favourite topics of the electoral campaigns of the candidates from the Islamic movement, both in Madaba and in the other Jordanian towns, while the Islamic candidate who was elected president of the town council in 1995 came from a family of Palestinian origin that had arrived in 1930 to work as tenant farmers on the land of the Beni Sakhr tribes.

The control of the municipality by the Muslims evidenced a social and political fracture within the Muslim population itself. This was obvious in all the municipal elections since 1981 where two opposing lists were formed: one headed or supported by Islamic movements and another essentially made-up of members of the Muslim tribal groups. As for the Christian groups, after having boycotted the two municipal elections that followed the 1981 election, they joined the Muslim tribes and presented a common list to oppose the Islamic movements.

In any case, in addition to the challenge of controlling the municipality, the political rise of the Islamic movements is an indication of a community-centred social life and the shrinking of intercommunity areas of exchange and socialisation.

Islamic associative and mutual aid networks have been created that in turn have organised religious, educational, social and cultural activities, while behaviours, dress and the occupation of public spaces are increasingly Islamised... In reaction, the Church has created another movement to organise community, social, educational and cultural activities.
4. Urban revitalization and Social development

4.1 A CITY AND A COMMUNITY IN THE COURSE OF RECOMPOSITION

The urban, demographic social and economic transformations that the town of Madaba knew during the last decades have led to calling into question the social and spatial order that characterized the city during nearly one century. These transformations questioned in particular the social, economic and political predominance of the Christian lineage groups which were at the origin of the foundation of the city. They also questioned the old space structure of the city and its development which was centered on its historical core.

However, these transformations have not yet led to the construction of a new social order integrating the various groups in a structured community capable of going beyond the individual interests to deal with the collective interests and stakes. They have not given place, either, to the emergence of a spatial order integrating the various components and functions of the city in a coherent urban structure having its own space of centrality and its own public space. Madaba is then today a city in transition facing a double process of social decomposition and urban fragmentation. Moreover, these processes are worsened by an economic context characterized by the crisis of “the economy of rent” and the scarcity of employment and of the migratory resources.

In other words, the city must today deal with three closely related challenges: rebuilding its social cohesion, ensuring its urban integration, and starting a new impetus for economic development.

Dealing with these challenges however means facing a whole range of interdependent problems which affect the social and urban structure of the city, question its social cohesion, and feed the tension between its various groups and communities:

- **Degradation of the urban and social fabric of the historical center.** The physical deterioration of the urban fabric, of housing, and of the residential fabric of the historical center has strongly fed the process of impoverishment of its social fabric and contributed to the degradation of its commercial fabric and of its function of centrality. Thus, in spite of its patrimonial and symbolic value, and in spite of the attachment of the population to this high place of collective memory, the town centre is today a physically and socially run down space. This degradation has strongly affected its role as a public space and heavily handicapped the development of economic activities related to tourism. This situation has also contributed to the weakening of social cohesion and to the deterioration of the intercommunity relationships: the degradation of the historical center is lived by a good part of the Christian population as a threat affecting their collective existence as groups, their communal spaces and even their presence in the city. They blame the “newcomers” for this situation and assimilate it to one of encircling and invasion.

- **Fragmentation of urban centrality.** In the absence of a strategy of urban planning and development, the strong demographic growth resulted in an anarchistic and uncontrolled urban growth. Thus, the degradation of the urban fabric of the historical center has been accompanied by the development of the commercial fabric of the town in a linear, functional and disorganized way, in particular along the two streets which lead to Amman. Consequently, the city finds itself in a paradoxical situation: it has strongly reinforced its commercial activities and its regional function of centrality but has lost its own space of centrality. Thus, the city has been reduced to a series of functions and functional spaces without having a center or a public space where the different groups of the population could meet, dialogue, and exchange ideas.

- **Urban disintegration.** The anarchistic growth of the urban and residential fabric transformed the city into disparate territories, without unity and coherence. The socio-spatial order that, for a long time, had organized the city in a mosaic of communitarian territories or district-communities juxtaposed and organized around a central space left its place to a more and more destructured and disorganized urban space. Urban disorder does not only
characterize the urban morphology of the city but also each of its residential spaces which have developed during the last decades: anarchistic construction to which is added the absence or the weakness of infrastructure and urban services which make of them the de-structured territories they are.

- **Social and residential segregation.** The crisis of the urban structure and fabric has strongly contributed to the decomposition of the social fabric and the degradation of the intercommunity relationships. This crisis of "living together" is visible in Madaba today through a double process: a process of social segregation which leads to an increasing social polarization of the urban spaces and to the impoverishment and continued degradation of the social fabric of several territories of the city; and a process of communitarian segregation whose most salient manifestations are the strategy to re-conquer the town center by the Christian communities (refusal to sell or to let out...) and the escape of a part of these communities towards a new "homogeneous" residential zone located more than 10 km away from the city.

- **Degradation of the public space and spirit and of the domain of collective action.** The crisis of the public space combines several dimensions:
  - the scarcity and even the disappearance of public spaces and places as physical spaces for intercommunity meeting and communication. With the degradation of the historical center, Madaba looks like a collection of mono functional spaces (commercial spaces, residential spaces, etc.) deprived of public places;
  - a crisis of the standards of behaviors and the way of being in public which feeds from a double process: the communitarization of the social life and "the Islamization" of the behaviors and clothing (in particular for women). Thus, clothing becomes not a sign of difference only, but also an act of differentiation, a marker of social and public space which determines the interactions and the relations in public;
  - the increasing scarcity of spaces and activities of socialization and of entertainment which goes beyond the tribal or communitarian framework;
  - communitarization / tribalization of the local political sphere, the "public" debate and the forms of collective action.

- **Economic crisis.** The city faces at present a major socio-economic challenge. For several decades, public employment and the networks of emigration constituted two major components of the urban economy and the resources of its inhabitants. However, these two sources are called into question today and the city must be mobilized to develop its economic activities in order to be able to fight poverty and the growing rates of unemployment which affect in particular the populations "without tribes" and the youth. Among the potential resources on which the city could count, tourism and the activities related to it, in particular the crafts industry, constitute an important stake. This would however depend on the restoration of the historical center and the setting up of a commercial structure and services capable of attracting tourists and of making them increase their stay in the city.

- **Crisis of governance which is centered on the municipal institution.** The problems that the city faces today are closely related to the weaknesses that characterize the municipal institution and to its incapacity to assume its role in many fields: Absence of any strategy for city planning; weakness of the role of the municipality in urban management, in setting up and maintaining infrastructure and urban services; Absence of any implication in the field of economic and social development; Absence of the mechanisms of accountability and forms of dialogue and participation of the local population. The weaknesses of the municipal institution are undoubtedly partly related to its weak autonomy, the poor level of its human resources, and the weakness of its technical, financial and organizational capabilities, etc. However, these weaknesses are far from being the only problems in question. They are, like the weakness of its technical and organizational capabilities, inseparable from the problems of local governance. Indeed, the prevalence of the logic of "rent" and clientelism in the relationship between the State and the municipality as well as in the reports of the municipality to the population and local groups, transformed the municipal institution into an object of appropriation intended to control the local milieu, to reinforce the
capacity of such or such an individual or group, and to allow these individuals and groups to draw some material and symbolic benefit from it. This has led to the weakening of the capacities of the municipality and the marginalization of its role in assuming responsibility for solving the problems of the city and the community. Moreover, instead of being the framework and the vector for construction and reinforcement of social cohesion, the municipality and the conflicts over its control have contributed to the worsening of the divisions and cleavages between the various local groups.

4.2 THE PROGRAM OF URBAN REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL CENTER AND THE STAKES OF DEVELOPMENT

In this social and urban context, up to what point does the program of urban revitalization of the town of Madaba make it possible to respond to the challenges and problems which the city faces today?

In fact, the program focuses on the revitalization of the historical center by combining four levels of intervention: physical improvement of the urban space of the center (through the restoration of the streets, the pavements, the infrastructure and the road station); a socio-urban action through the designation of the Saraya building as a public place and the creation of a "park for entertainment and crafts industry"; a regulatory action intended to preserve the historical patrimony through the control of the construction activities; and an institutional action by building the capacities of the municipality, in particular in the field of urban management and the provision of urban services.

In fact, the problems of the city could not be reduced to that of the center, and the program itself does not claim that through the revitalization of the center, it will solve the problems of the city. However, the revitalization of the center constitutes a strategic starting point to commence a process of an urban, social and socio-economic development. Indeed, just as the problem of the degradation of the social and urban fabric of the historical center concentrates all the problems which we described earlier, its revitalization is at the crossroads of all the stakes of urban, social and economic development. In other words, the question is not to be satisfied that through the program of revitalization the problems of the historical center would be dealt with but rather to believe that it is the start of a response to the challenges and the problems of the city on the basis of its history.

Thus, taking into account the strategic stakes that the historical center present, on one hand, and the multidimensional nature of the actions under consideration by the program of revitalization, on the other, we could consider that the program would have multiple effects for the city as a whole, in terms of improving urban integration, reinforcing social cohesion and developing the local economy:

- **Safeguarding the urban patrimony of the historical center and inversion of the process of degradation of its residential fabrics.** The restoration of urban space (through works on the streets, pavements, infrastructures, and the road station) combined with the regulatory action intending to control the activities of construction should make it initially possible to preserve the cultural patrimony, and thus the historical memory of the city, which incarnates the urban fabric and the old buildings of the center. Moreover, the improvement of the urban space and environment which would result from the actions of restoration envisaged by the program, would make it possible to develop all of the residential space and, consequently, to encourage and accelerate the process of restoration of residences, in compliance with the regulatory standards which will be applied. From this point of view, the attachment to the historical center of the population, in particular of the Christian communities, will constitute a very important support for this dynamic of restoration.

- **Development of activities related to tourism and local economy.** The noticeable improvement of the quality of the urban space and environment of the historical center, of the historical and symbolic dimensions of its urban fabric, and the great value of its archaeological patrimony will make it possible for the town to better develop its tourist potential and to increase the number of tourist whom it attracts (foreigners but also Jordanians, of the capital in particular) and to increase the duration of their stay. This will impel the develop-
ment, in the historical center, of a whole range of commercial activities, services and entertainment related to tourism. This tourist function, in addition to the creation of a "park for entrainment and crafts industry", will be also an essential point of support for the development of the handicraft activities, which already constitute in Madaba a source of income for a considerable number of people, in particular for women from less privileged milieus.

- **Rebuilding the space of urban centrality.** While making it possible for the historical center to be the place for developing a new economic function centered on tourism and tourism-related activities, the program of revitalization would equally enable the town to recover its space of urban centrality. Indeed, based on its new economic function, its sociospatial role as a public space, and its spatial position, the historical center will be able to relay and gather in the same territorial unit the various functions of economic and urban centrality which are actually dispersed at present. Thus, by bringing together and integrating in the same space the three major commercial axes, the road station, the archaeological park, the new tourism-related activities, and the administrative offices, etc, the historical core would be again the center of the modern city.

- **Starting a process of urban integration.** The recovery of the historical center as a space of economic and urban centrality allows it to become a space of urban attraction and polarity and, consequently, a space of liaison and connection between various spaces and territories of the city which find themselves at present taken by the dynamics of fragmentation and crumbling.

- **Reinforcement of the social cohesion and improvement of the intercommunity relations.** The restoration and the revitalization of the historical center could reinforce the social cohesion in multiple manners:
  - The improvement of the quality of urban fabric and spaces, the safeguarding of the architectural patrimony and the incitation to renovate it will quickly result in the improvement of its residential fabric and its retention capacity in particular for young couples who tend at present to desert it. The residential space of the center, which is a degraded and run down space today, will gradually become socially attractive. Such a process will allow the Christian communities (who are still the owners of the large majority of land and real estate in the historical center) to reinvest socially and economically in the center, to remove the threat of decomposition which weighs today on their communitarian spaces and to liberate themselves from a situation which they assimilate to a situation of invasion or encircling. Such a communitarian improvement will also encourage the Christian communities to reinvest fully in the social and public space of the city and to rebuild or reinforce their exchange and communication relationships with the other social groups.
  - **Reconstitution of urban public spaces.** The historical center, once renovated, will be able to lean on the characteristics of its spaces and its urban fabric as well as its patrimonial, historical, and symbolic dimensions, to become the public space of the city par excellence; the privileged place for meetings, exchange and communication between the various communities of the city and between the various age and sex groups. This assertion of the role of the center as a public space, as well as a privileged place for entertainment, will also take support from the development of the "park for entertainment" envisaged by the program as well as from the activities and the services which will be generated by the development of tourism. Such a development will particularly be of interest to the youth who are currently deprived of any space of meeting, leisure and socialization apart from the family and community spaces on one side, and school on the other. Thus, equipping Madaba with urban public spaces of quality constitutes a means of fighting against this form of exclusion which separates today between the privileged young people who have the right to the city since their socioeconomic situation enables them to pass a good part of their spare time in Amman where they have access to entertainment and the less privileged who do not have the right to the city and who must be satisfied by spending their spare time in Madaba.
  - **A value of exemplarity.** Moreover, this role of the historical center as a public space and as a space of centrality is conjugated to the diversity of its population which, de-
spite everything, continues to characterize its social and residential fabrics. This makes of the historical center the laboratory for the construction of the “living together” concept in Madaba. The success of the process of rebuilding an inter-communitarian space in the town centre will undoubtedly have a value of exemplarity for the whole town.

- The process of restoration and revitalization itself constitutes an opportunity for impelling an intercommunity collective dynamic which, while accompanying the setting up of the program and its various actions, could lead to the constitution of a collective space for debate, participation, and collective assumption of responsibility for the problems of the city.

- The revitalization of the historical centre constitutes an opportunity which will make it possible to build the capacities of the municipality (in particular in the field of urban management), to reinforce its role in the construction of social cohesion, and to improve the transparency and the accountability of municipal management. Indeed, the programme of revitalization of the historical centre closely links the physical improvements of urban space and the regulatory actions to the actions of construction and of improving the institutional capacities. The actions of capacity building approached here are limited to those which are strictly related to the implementation of the program of revitalization of the historical centre. Such actions are planned in a way as to inscribe them in a strategy aiming at the modernization of all departments and the improvement of the service delivery over the totality of the municipal territory (cf. the actions of capacity building and, in particular, the creation of a “cross-departmental municipal unit” founded on the concept of “Administration de Mission”). In addition, improving the “technical” capacities of the municipality will be conjugated to a strategy of reinforcing the forms of participation of the local actors and population (setting up of a local committee of consultation and monitoring of the program of revitalization). This implication of the local population will constitute an important support for establishing a transparent management system and for setting up mechanisms of accountability.

4.3 SOCIAL RISKS RELATED TO THE PROGRAM OF URBAN REVITALIZATION.

The programme of revitalization of the historical centre should be able to deal with several risks which could prevent it from achieving its goals of development and could even produce opposite effects to those wanted:

- Risks of communitarian appropriation and of increasing the tensions between the various groups and communities. The success of the program depends basically on its capacity to substitute the current logics of spatial appropriation and of communitarian enclaving by logics of accessibility to a diversified space of centrality and intercommunity exchange. Such a success strongly depends on the capacity of the program to closely link the urban and urbanistic interventions to an action aiming at impelling a dynamic for social development and for communication between the various groups and communities. On the other hand, nothing guarantees that an action of urban restoration could, in itself, produce the required social effects. It is even more likely that such an urbanistic action would lead to the reinforcement of the logics of appropriation and of the processes of social fragmentation. Indeed, taking into account the current strategies of the various groups and communities, and the property structure in the historical centre, any intervention that is reduced to the urban dimension only is most likely to lead to the production of a renovated and improved communitarian enclave on the expense of the objective of creating a public space federating the various territories and social groups of the city and of creating a space of centrality. Moreover, such an operation is likely to be perceived as an action supporting certain groups and territories of the city on the expense of other groups and territories, which would accentuate the intercommunity tensions and weaken the social cohesion even more. In order to avoid such risks, one should not be satisfied by organizing few briefing meetings nor even organizing a kind of “social accompanying measures” where “the interested actors” are invited to take part in a process of dialogue...
because we know perfectly well that such forms of dialogue will not be able to increase the participation beyond a limited circle of actors belonging, for their majority, to the Christian communities or even to certain tendency groups within these communities. Even if we assume that the circle of consultation is widened, it could not produce the desired effects unless it is convened on the basis of constructing clearly defined objects and social objectives which go beyond the simple "social accompanying measures" of the urban intervention. Thus, among the social objects which could constitute a support for developing a collective social dynamic, one could mention two actions of the program: the development of crafts industry and its articulation with the process of urban restoration and the creation of a pole for leisure activities catering for the young in particular. However, for them to have a dimension of social development (and economic with regard to the crafts industry), these two actions require the constitution of a collective and pluri-communitarian social actor capable of carrying out the projects and ensuring their social dimensions.

- **Risks of worsening the social and spatial segregation.** As it was highlighted earlier, the effectiveness and the sustainability of the program of urban revitalization depend on its capacity to constitute, beyond responding to specific problems of the historical centre, a starter for responding to the problems of the city. It is true that the inscription of the program in a global strategy for the development of centrality, public spaces and urban cohesion brings already the beginning of a response, however, this remains insufficient to guarantee the effects of the program in terms of urban integration and social cohesion if the improvement of urban management and the dynamics for the development of infrastructure and urban services are not quickly extended to the other territories of the city. Obviously, it is not a question to include such an extension in the programme of revitalization of the historical centre. It is the responsibility of the municipality and the State institutions to accompany this program by an effort to improve the situation in the other territories of the city as one could easily imagine the amplitude of the social effects resulting from the persistence of urban anarchy and the renunciation of certain territories of the city at the same time when the environment and urban services of the town centre had been clearly improved. Such a widening of the disparity between the territories of the city will inevitably be perceived as a situation of spatial and social segregation and is likely to affect, in the long term, the sustainability of the achievements obtained in the historical centre itself.

- **Risks related to the limited nature of the action of construction of the capacities of the municipality and of improving urban services: a possible questioning of the sustainability of the effects of the program.** In spite of their inscription in a transversal approach aiming at the modernization of the municipal action, the actions of construction of the municipal capacities remain limited to those which are directly related to the program of revitalization of the historical center (in particular improvement of management and urban services). However, if they are not articulated with other transversal and general actions aiming to improve the capacities of all municipal services (organization, human resources management, budgetary and financial control, mobilization of resources and improvement of the collection of local taxes...), the sustainability of these actions of reinforcement of the municipal capacities as well as the program of urban revitalization itself would be at risk.
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**Acknowledgment**

In addition to bibliographic research, this study was mainly based on field work that combined observation to the in situ analysis of urban fabrics and to non-structured interviews with around fifty people of different socio-economic backgrounds (Tradesmen, intellectuals, associative and institutional actors) and various community origins. However, the acquired knowledge of the city and its history is largely due to the patient assistance of Chadya Hamarneh and to her passionate knowledge of the city and of its inhabitants. A priceless share also goes to Geraldine Chatelard, for her extremely valuable work on Madaba and the long hours of discussion that she devoted to us.
6. Consultations undertaken

6.1 THE CITY CONSULTATION WORKSHOP

The City Consultation Workshop, divided in two sections (morning an afternoon), was held in Madaba on December 6th, 2004.

The MOTA actively participated in the organization of the workshops. The World Bank Team was represented by Raffaele Gorjux (team leader); Ramzi Kawar (local coordinator); Linda Faris (socio-economic team); David Sabatello (urban planner); Marwan Abi-Samra (institutional management specialist).

The first part of the workshop was attended by MOTA, the Governor, the Mayor and other key stakeholders, prominent community members and civil society organizations. The aim was to present a preliminary project outline and introduce the concept of the City Revitalisation Pact and obtain comments and feedback.

The presentation of the preliminary project outline was realized through a powerpoint presentation. The communication was completely held in Arabic by Marwan Abi-Samra. The following topics were presented:

- the second tourism development project;
- the third tourism development project; the secondary cities network; benefits and target population;
- expected outcomes;
- the city urban structure;
- the city revitalization program; the city revitalization pact;
- focus group discussion slide.

The PowerPoint presentation terminated with a series of questions, that were proposed to the audience to elicit the debate and obtain points of view, feedback and proposals. The discussion was held completely in Arabic, and was moderated by Ramzi Kawar. Linda Faris translated simultaneously for the non-Arabic speaking team members.

The second part of the workshop was attended mainly by the Mayor and key municipal staff. The aim was to collect information and discuss the institutional capacity of the Municipality, on the basis of the preliminary findings and results of the desk review and the desk research.

Specific issues emerged concerning the need of reinforcing the management of the cities through specialized tools; the need of improving inter-governmental coordination; the need of increasing the commitment to enforce existing regulations. All these issues are significant contents for the City Revitalization Pact.

The concept of a City Revitalization Pact had good reception, and the proposed structure had no objections, although the need exist of a thorough work to better define its contents.

A lot of suggestions and proposals came out concerning possible project actions, both in the public sector area and from the private sector. The latter will be investigated for PPP development.

The Madaba Consultation Workshop was held on Monday, December 6th, in the Madaba Municipal council meeting room).
TIMETABLE

9:30 Workshop begins
Workshop opening speech (Governor, Mayor)
Presentation of the project outline (Abi-Samra)

10:20 Open discussion

11:15 Coffee break offered by COTECNO

11:50 Open discussion

12:45 End of workshop part I

13:00 Lunch offered by the Governor

15:00 Workshop Part II

17:30 End of workshop part II

6.1.2 WORKSHOP PART I

SYNTHESIS OF MAIN ISSUES

1) There is a need for a structural Master Plan to coordinate and direct the urban growth and the economic development.

2) Infrastructure is quite well organized however there is a need to raise awareness about traffic, parking and solid waste. Families do not want garbage containers in front of their house. The staff who are doing the collections are not doing a good job.

3) As long as municipal infrastructures and services are concerned, the main issue are: the storm drainage network, which is not complete (houses get flooded, the worst area is
near the museum); the need to organise and control circulation and parking through a comprehensive traffic management plan.

4) A number of suggestions came concerning the Saraya Building: the Saraya is to be the symbol of the city (even the brand of the city) as it could be seen from far away; this could become the centre of the city; the hill will have two symbols (the Mosque and the Church), in addition to the Saraya.

5) Great attention was paid by the attendees to the issue of heritage buildings: heritage preservation faces several problems (financial, multiple ownership, decision making, responsibility); there was a request for a study to evaluate the cost of the rehabilitation in order to have a basis for the 87 buildings to rehabilitate; suggestions there were to set up a holding company for the rehabilitation of the heritage buildings, with heritage building owners as stockholders (this is seen as a very effective solution to the problem of the fragmented ownership of buildings); moreover, it was pointed out that the training organization and marketing could all use the heritage buildings, thus introducing new destinations for adaptive re-use other than bed and breakfast. The Madaba Heritage Society could be the coordinating body.

6) There was the request to ensure coordination in the issue of commercial licenses to avoid the concentration of too many shops of the same kind in the same street/part of the city.

7) The King’s message for Madaba through Mr. Akram Masarwah, to take into account the need to improve the handicraft for the whole governorate.

8) There were a number of requests to create an handicraft centre.

9) There were a certain number of suggestion to revive and improve the existing Mosaic school.

10) The social dynamic: there is strong social community organizations in different fields, social heritage etc…; there is an important networking between the NGOs, and between the Municipality and the NGOs.

11) For the City Revitalisation Pact, it was suggested that special committees for each neighborhood could be set up which could be part of the Pact.

12) The rehabilitation of the streets should be thought on in terms of how these actions could create a dynamic that revitalizes the city. The most problematic action is K. Talal Street. The program should take into consideration other streets. The relocation of deteriorated stores is not necessary since they could be refurbished and kept because it is important to keep the existing commercial fabric of the central streets.

13) The Mayor pointed out the need of using different tendering tools for the rehabilitation works. The requirement of the public sector procedures to tender for the lowest price does not ensure the level of quality required by this kind of works.

14) A certain number of on-going initiatives in Madaba was pointed out, including: two universities (Private Madaba University funded by the Vatican and the German-Jordanian university). They would like to incorporate the Mosaic school into the latter. The new King’s college (military college).

15) Madaba people proved to be are aware of the existing study, and gave the impression of their willingness to be part of the implementation of the new project.

16) A number of suggestions come to improve inter-governmental coordination, creation of coordination bodies, etc. The need of the municipality is to coordinate their efforts with the other government organizations through a committee or coordinating body.

17) There is a suggestion for a new bus station (study already existing).
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6.1.3 WORKSHOP PART II

ASSESSMENT OF CITY INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

The second part of the workshop (afternoon session) was concentrated on the assessment of the city institutional capacity. The meeting was coordinated by Manwan Abi-Samra, and was attended mainly by the Mayor and key municipal staff. The aim was to collect information and discuss the institutional capacity of the Municipality, on the basis of the preliminary findings and results of the desk review and the desk research.

The results of this meeting are incorporated in the main report.